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I. Introduction
In 2005, after decades of waiting, Andreas crossed the Green
Line, a United Nations buffer zone, into northern Cyprus for the
first and only time since 1974. Although Andreas was born in
Cyprus in 1943 and has lived there for most of his life, the Cyprus
he has known for the last thirty-five years is a divided nation, torn
apart by conflict and Turkey's 1974 invasion. For many years,
Greek and Turkish Cypriots lived in harmony, but today, they
remain separated by the buffer zone and by the country's
tumultuous history.
When Andreas reached his destination, Famagusta, he found
the city unrecognizable. Many of his close relatives had lived in
the city prior to the invasion. But when he visited in 2005, he
found all of their homes destroyed and all of their possessions
stolen. Nothing remained of the lives they had built. Forced to
leave, they fled without knowing if they would ever return. In the
words of Andreas, "imagine if you have your own house, your
property, your family, and some troops from another nation come
and force you out and you move to another place with no money,
no job. The worst [is] if some of your family are killed or are
missing persons. Imagine that you cannot return back to the place
you were born or lived for many years."
The international community has condemned the invasion that
divested Andreas' relatives of their property, yet many Greek
Cypriots remain uncompensated and without any closure.
Andreas is unsure whether he would cross the Green Line again,
and as the years pass, his hopes of political settlement and a united
Cyprus have begun to fade. Andreas is not alone in his
concerns... .
Since 1974, the Mediterranean island of Cyprus has been
ethnically segregated, with a United Nations ("U.N.") buffer zone
separating Turkish Cypriots ("TCs") in northern Cyprus from
Greek Cypriots ("GCs") in the south.2 The division occurred after
I Interview with Andreas, Citizen of the Republic of Cyprus (Mar. 15, 2011).
Andreas did not wish for his full name to be used in this article.
2 See MARGARET W. BARTLETT, CYPRUS, THE UNITED NATIONS, AND THE QUEST
FOR UNITY 40 (2007); see also VAN COUFOUDAKIS, INTERNATIONAL AGGRESSION AND
VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS: THE CASE OF TURKEY IN CYPRUS 32 (Theofanis G.
Stavrou et al. eds., 2008).
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intercommunal tensions peaked between the Turkish and Greek
Cypriot communities, sparking an invasion by Turkey, purportedly
to protect the TC minority.' As a result of the invasion, Turkey
managed to gain control of over one-third of Cyprus, forcing GCs
out of their homes in the north and preventing their return.4
Today, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus ("TRNC"), a de
facto entity recognized as a legitimate government only by
Turkey, governs the northern part of Cyprus in violation of
international law.' Although over three and a half decades have
passed since the 1974 invasion, there has been no resolution to
what has become known as the "Cyprus Problem."'
Though a comprehensive solution has proven elusive, GCs
have sought relief by applying to the European Court of Human
Rights ("ECHR" or the "Court"), claiming that Turkey's actions
during the invasion and afterward violated and continue to violate
the European Convention on Human Rights ("Convention"). The
potential availability of recourse to the ECHR was an encouraging
development for GCs, particularly GCs seeking compensation for
violations of their property rights.' However, due to a March 2010
ECHR decision, Demopoulos and Others v. Turkey,' GCs may no
longer rely on the ECHR to vindicate their rights as a court of first
instance.o In Demopoulos, the ECHR determined that the TRNC-
created Immovable Property Commission ("IPC") was an
adequate and effective domestic remedy." As a result, GCs must
apply to the IPC and satisfy the Convention's exhaustion of local
3 See COUFOUDAKIS, supra note 2, at 31, 32.
4 See id. at 3, 32 (noting that despite Turkey's claim that the goal of the invasion
was "to restore the status quo ante in Cyprus," it has failed to do so).
5 See id. at 27-28.
6 See id at 3.
7 See, e.g., Loizidou v. Turkey, 23 EUR. CT. H.R. 513 (1997) [hereinafter Loizidou
1997].
8 See Kudret Ozersay & Ayla Giurel, The Cyprus Problem at the European Court
of Human Rights, in CYPRUS: A CONFLICT AT THE CROSSROADS 273, 286 (Thomas Diez
& Nathalie Tocci eds., 2009) (stating that Turkey has complied with the ECHR judgment
in Loizidou v. Turkey).
9 App. No. 46113/99, 50 EuR. CT. H.R. SE14 (2010) [hereinafter Demopoulos].
10 See id. at 23.
11 See id. at 41; see generally id. at 10-14 (explaining the structure and purpose of
the IPC).
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remedies requirement before applying to the ECHR for review.12
In concluding the IPC was satisfactory, the Court dismissed GC
concerns about the efficacy and neutrality of the IPC. ' The
ECHR similarly rejected the GCs' claim that legitimizing the IPC
paves the way for recognition of the TRNC, an entity the
international community has deemed to be "illegal and invalid." 4
This Comment will begin by describing the history of the
Cyprus Problem and the current political state of affairs in Cyprus
in Section II. Sections III and IV will explain the development of
the ECHR and its enforcement mechanism, the Committee of
Ministers ("Committee"), as well as the role of the ECHR in the
Cyprus Problem. Although the primary focus of this Comment is
the role of the ECHR in Cyprus, Section V will briefly discuss a
recent decision by the European Court of Justice ("ECJ")
addressing the enforceability of GC property claims in other
European Union ("EU") countries.
II. A Brief History of the Cyprus Problem
A. Early History: 330 A.D. through 1878
Understanding the Cyprus Problem requires an appreciation of
the historical events culminating in the division of the island.
Between 330 A.D. and 1191 A.D., Cyprus was under Greek rule."
Due to Cyprus's strategic location in the Mediterranean Sea,
however, many other nations subsequently conquered the island,
influencing Cypriot culture in the process.16 Even so, the impact
of Greek rule persisted throughout the centuries, enduring over
300 years of control by the Ottoman Empire between 1571 and
1878 and the influx of a Turkish minority on the island during that
12 See id. at 41.
13 See id. at 41-42; see also Ozersay & Gilrel, supra note 8, at 284.
14 See THE CYPRUS ISSUE: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, 1878-2007 373 (Murat Metin
Hakki ed., 2007) [hereinafter THE CYPRUS ISSUE] (citing U.N. Security Council
Resolution 550 as referring to the TRNC as "illegal and invalid" and calling on "all
States not to recognise the purported state of the 'Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus'
set up by secessionist acts and . . . not to facilitate or in any way assist the aforesaid
secessionist entity").
15 See BARTLETr, supra note 2, at 7-9.
16 See id. at 8-9.
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period." The Turkish minority introduced Cyprus to the Turkish
language and customs as well as to the Islamic faith."
B. British Rule: 1878 through 1960
In 1878, Britain's support of the Ottoman Empire ultimately
led to British administrative control of Cyprus,' 9 followed by
annexation in 1914.20 Cyprus became a British Crown Colony in
1925,21 remaining so until it gained its independence in 1960.22
During Ottoman and British rule, "peaceful bicommunal
coexistence was the norm" for the GC and TC populations, and the
communities were interspersed throughout Cyprus. 2 3 Despite the
relative peace of the period, toward the end of British rule,
"[c]onflict in Cypriot society was evolving along multiple lines,
ranging from the anticolonial struggle against the British, to
interethnic tensions between GCs and TCs to intra-ethnic rivalries
among the GC as well as the TC community."2 4
To combat British control over Cyprus, the GCs formed
EOKA, a paramilitary force opposing British rule, in 1955.25 The
leader of EOKA, George Grivas, built his career in the Greek
military and endorsed violence as a means of progress. 26 GCs,
including Archbishop Makarios, began rallying for enosis, or
political union, with Greece.27 In response, the British attempted
to suppress the EOKA through harsh tactics, including
imprisonments, interrogations, torture, killings, and the
deportation of Makarios.
17 See id. at 8; see also COUFOUDAKIS, supra note 2, at 5.
18 See CouFouDAKIs, supra note 2, at 5.
19 See James Ker-Lindsay, A History of Cyprus Peace Proposals, in REUNIFYING
CYPRUS: THE ANNAN PLAN AND BEYOND 11, 12 (Andrekos Varnava & Hubert Faustmann
eds., 2009).
20 See BARTLETT, supra note 2, at 9.
21 See id.
22 See COUFOUDAKIS, supra note 2, at 5.
23 Id.
24 HARRY ANASTASIOU, THE BROKEN OLIvE BRANCH: NATIONALISM, ETHNIC
CONFLICT, AND THE QUEST FOR PEACE IN CYPRUS 3 (2008).
25 See BARTLETT, supra note 2, at 14.
26 See ANASTASIOU, supra note 24, at 86-88.
27 See BARTLETT, supra note 2, at 9, 14.
28 See id. at 14 (revealing that Britain detained over 1,500 Greeks and GCs
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In addition to fueling tensions between the British and the
GCs, the push for enosis increased animosity between GCs and
TCs.2 9 With Greek nationalism on the rise, TCs gradually "began
to form their own political organizations along ethnic and
nationalist lines, similar to those that had evolved in the GC
community." 3 0 Intercommunal fighting increased as the TCs
attempted to eliminate the EOKA and, with Turkey's aid, created
their own army, Volkan. 1 Rather than independence or enosis,
TCs advocated either the return of Cyprus to Turkey, the Ottoman
Empire's successor, or the partition of Cyprus along ethnic lines,
also known as takism.32 Takism would permit each side to join its
"motherland" and engage in self-determination."
As violence erupted, the possibility of Greece and Turkey, two
North Atlantic Treaty Organization ("NATO") allies, going to war
posed a real threat.34 To prevent the conflict from escalating, both
countries began to support independence for Cyprus." In 1959,
Great Britain, Greece and Turkey participated in the Zilrich and
London Agreements ("Agreements"), which led to Cypriot
independence on August 16, 1960.36 Unfortunately, the limited
participation by GCs and TCs in the negotiation of the Agreements
inhibited acceptance of the terms and paved the way for
substantial unrest and dissatisfaction.37
associated with EOKA); see also COUFOUDAKIS, supra note 2, at 16-17 (referencing
Greece's filing of an interstate application against Britain in the European Commission
of Human Rights in both 1956 and 1957, alleging that Britain had engaged in "torture
and ill treatment" of GC detainees in violation of the Convention).
29 See Ker-Lindsay, supra note 19, at 12.
30 ANASTASIOU, supra note 24, at 88-89.
31 See BARTLETr, supra note 2, at 14.
32 See ANASTASIOU, supra note 24, at 90.
33 See id.
34 See Ker-Lindsay, supra note 19, at 13.
35 See id.
36 See BARTLETr, supra note 2, at 16; see also COUFOUDAKIS, supra note 2, at 1.
For more information about the Agreements, see THE CYPRUS ISSUE, supra note 14, at
31-39; see also ANASTASIOU, supra note 24, at 94.
37 See COUFOUDAKIS, supra note 2, at 1; see also ANASTASIOU, supra note 24, at 94
(explaining that GCs ultimately accepted the compromise in return for amnesty for
EOKA political prisoners, whereas TCs accepted it in exchange for guaranteed
protection against the Greek minority).
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By 1960, nearly eighty percent of Cypriots were GC, with the
remaining twenty percent consisting largely of TCs." To ensure
minority representation in the new republic, the Agreements
established a quota system whereby the Cypriot President would
be GC, but the Vice President and a substantial minority of the
civil service and the army would be TC.39 In addition to granting
"extraordinary veto powers" to the TC minority, the Agreements
also contained the Treaty of Guarantee and the Treaty of
Alliance.40 As a result, Great Britain, Greece and Turkey became
"guarantors of the new [R]epublic," entitled to maintain a military
presence on the island and possessing "vaguely defined rights of
intervention" in Cypriot affairs if necessary to preserve the
nation's independence.4'
C. Intercommunal Tensions: 1960-1974
In the new Republic, GCs and TCs continued to view each
other suspiciously. 42 In order to make the Cypriot Constitution
more palatable to GCs, Makarios, now President of Cyprus,
proposed amendments to reduce the powers granted to the TC
minority; however, Turkey rejected the amendments, and
intercommunal clashes ensued from 1963 to 1964.43 Breaking free
from the government, TC leaders began to encourage TCs to move
into Turkish enclaves and to reignite the call for takism." As of
December 1963, TCs ceased to have a role in the Republic's
38 See Ker-Lindsay, supra note 19, at 13 (identifying eighteen percent of Cypriots
as TCs, seventy-eight percent as GCs, and four percent as Maronites, Latins, or
Armenians).
39 See BARTLETr, supra note 2, at 16 (indicating that thirty percent of the civil
service and forty percent of the army would be TCs).
40 See CouFOuDAKIs, supra note 2, at 1; BARTLErr, supra note 2, at 16.
41 See COUFOUDAKIs, supra note 2, at 1; BARTLETr, supra note 2, at 16; see also
Ker-Lindsay, supra note 19, at 13.
42 See ANASTASIOU, supra note 24, at 94-95 (referencing the "artificial solidarity"
created by the new Republic as it forced together rival groups "deeply divided around
competing nationalist movements and political ideologies" without resolving underlying
issues); see also BARTLETr, supra note 2, at 23-27.
43 See Ker-Lindsay, supra note 19, at 13-14.
44 See BARTLETr, supra note 2, at 17-18; see also ANASTASIOU, supra note 24, at
121 (indicating that in the TC enclaves, soldiers from Turkey helped provide security
and aided in administration).
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government. 45 The U.N. deployed a peacekeeping force, the
United Nations Force in Cyprus ("UNFICYP"),4 6 in March 1964,
to protect against Turkey's threatened military intervention and the
increasing violence.4 7 UNFICYP remains a presence in Cyprus
today.48 By the end of 1964, GCs directly controlled ninety-seven
percent of the land in Cyprus although the TCs comprised nearly
twenty percent of the population.4 9
In the decade preceding the Turkish invasion in 1974, Cyprus
was plagued by "[a]ssassination attempts on President Makarios,
along with political murders, abductions, accusations, and
reprisals," making "frequent outbreaks of bloodshed ... no
surprise.""o During this period, Makarios abandoned enosis as a
goal and adopted a more moderate pro-independence stance.
Despite Makarios's willingness to accept independence, other
GCs, led by Grivas, formed EOKA B to revitalize the movement
for enosis.2 In 1973, an autocratic junta ruling with "unreserved
authoritarianism" seized control of Greece and aligned with
EOKA B, hoping to establish a "Greek right-wing dictatorship" in
Cyprus and to facilitate enosis." The EOKA B and the junta
ultimately attempted to oust Makarios from the presidency on July
14, 1974, prompting swift intervention by Turkey.54
D. The Turkish Invasion, Its Aftermath, and the TRNC: 1974
to Present
On July 20, 1974, Turkey invaded Cyprus, causing a civil war
among Cypriots to escalate into "an interstate, ethnonational
45 See Ker-Lindsay, supra note 19, at 14.
46 See id.
47 See COUFOUDAKIS, supra note 2, at 1; see also BARTLETF, supra note 2, at 1, 3.
48 See COUFOUDAKIS, supra note 2, at 1; see also BARTLETT, supra note 2, at 3.
49 See ANASTASIOU, supra note 24, at 121 (finding that as a result of the violence,
483 TCs and thirty-two GCs were labeled as missing and approximately 25,000 TCs
became refugees).
50 Id. at 98.
51 See Ker-Lindsay, supra note 19, at 15.
52 See ANASTASIOU, supra note 24, at 98 (finding that other GCs began to increase
ties with communist countries, leading to increased interest by the West, including the
United States, in the Cyprus Problem); see also Ker-Lindsay, supra note 19, at 15.
53 See ANASTASIOU, supra note 24, at 99; Ker-Lindsay, supra note 19, at 15.
54 See ANASTASIOU, supra note 24, at 99; Ker-Lindsay, supra note 19, at 15.
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war."" A mere three days after the invasion, the Greek junta
collapsed, restoring democratic rule in Greece and returning
Makarios to the Cypriot presidency. Although Turkey claimed
the purpose of its invasion was to restore the status quo in Cyprus,
Turkey ultimately occupied over one-third of Cyprus, ignoring
international condemnation and U.N. Security Council resolutions
deploring its actions.5 7 To attempt to justify the invasion, Turkey
stated it was merely protecting TCs pursuant to its obligations
under the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee; however, Turkey did little to
promote the reunification of Cyprus. " Today, a buffer zone
maintained by UNFICYP known as the "Green Line" continues to
divide the island into the GC Republic of Cyprus ("Republic") in
the south and the defacto government, known as the TRNC, in the
north.5 9 Attempts at resolving the stalemate have all failed.o
As a result of the Turkish invasion, 170,000 GCs were forcibly
expelled from their homes in northern Cyprus.6 ' These refugees
represented twenty-eight percent of the island's total population in
1974 and seventy percent of the population in the area that is now
under Turkish control.6 2 The GCs living in northern Cyprus:
fled for their lives during and in the aftermath of the
invasion. Their personal property, including their homes,
were seized, and movable property was removed by
Turkish soldiers. Media reports showed looted property,
including cars, buses, household goods, etc., in cities in
southern Turkey. Turkish naval vessels transported these
possessions to the Turkish mainland. Greek Cypriot
55 See ANASTASIOU, supra note 24, at 99.
56 See id.
57 See COUFOUDAKIS, supra note 2, at 2.
58 See ANASTASIOU, supra note 24, at 100.
59 See BARTLETr, supra note 2, at 1, 3, 143.
60 See generally BARTLETr, supra note 2, at 3-4 (describing the ongoing
involvement of UNFICYP); see also THE CYPRUS ISSUE, supra note 14, at 381 (quoting
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1217, "reaffirm[ing] that the status quo is
unacceptable and that negotiations on a final political solution of the Cyprus problem
have been at an impasse for too long; . . . a Cyprus settlement must be based on a State
of Cyprus with a single sovereignty and international personality and a single
citizenship, with its independence and territorial integrity safe-guarded").
61 See COUFOUDAKIS, supra note 2, at 3.
62 See id.
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homes and furnishings were distributed to Turkish
Cypriots and later on to illegal Turkish
settlers.. . . Buildings along the ceasefire line were burned
along with orchards and crops belonging to Greek
Cypriots. Religious and archeological properties bore the
brunt of the wanton destruction and looting.6 3
To complete the division of the island along ethnic lines, 40,000
TCs left their homes in the southern part of Cyprus and moved
north.' An estimated 3,000 individuals were killed in the conflict,
and an additional 1,619 were declared missing, some of whom are
believed to have been taken to prisons in Turkey, but whose fate
remains unknown.6 ' Today, the Committee on Missing Persons
("CMP") continues to identify bodies with DNA analysis; 66
however, the CMP is not authorized to investigate the cause of
death or to determine the identity of the responsible party.
Furthermore, the CMP may not investigate actions by Turkish
officials or army personnel in Cyprus.6 8
The thirty-four percent of the island's total area that Turkey's
army overran contained seventy percent of the nation's resources,
forty percent of its schools, nearly half of its agricultural
production, twenty percent of its forests, and many of the island's
ports, including Famagusta, which handled over eighty percent of
Cyprus's trade.6 9 Turkish troops looted GC homes and businesses
and confiscated property in northern Cyprus; evidence also
indicates that GC citizens were raped, detained, murdered,
tortured, and deported. 70 After the July invasion, refugees
63 Id at 41-42.
64 See Ker-Lindsay, supra note 19, at 16; see also COUFOUDAKIS, supra note 2, at
3.
65 See ANASTASIOU, supra note 24, at 122-23; see also COUFOUDAKIS, supra note 2,
at 49 (referencing the belief that the 1,619 people who remained missing were alive
when hostilities ceased and criticizing the fact that nearly forty percent of the missing
were civilians captured by Turkish forces).
66 See COUFOUDAKIS, supra note 2, at 53 (stating that the CMP has determined the
identity of the bodies of eighty-five of the missing).
67 See id at 3.
68 See id at 3, 49-59 (explaining the role of the CMP in identifying remains and
referring to Turkey's refusal to account for the fate of the missing or to produce its
records of Cypriot detainees in violation of the Geneva Convention).
69 See ANASTASIOU, supra note 24, at 123.
70 See COUFOUDAKIS, supra note 2, at 4.
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depended on medical care, food, and temporary housing provided
by the International Red Cross and the Cypriot government; given
the island's small size, the invasion was catastrophic to GCs.7 1
Although the majority of GCs fled in July and August 1974,
about 20,000 Greek and Maronite Cypriots known as "the
enclaved" refused to leave their homes in northern Cyprus and
remained in an area under Turkish military control.72 In recent
years, their numbers have dwindled, with only approximately 500
remaining, many of whom are elderly; the rest left due to the
"oppression, harassment, denial of educational opportunities or
access to medical care, restrictions in their freedom of movement
and their religious rights, and violations of their home, family, and
privacy rights.""
On November 15, 1983, Rauf Denktash, the leader of the TC
community, unilaterally declared independence and established
the TRNC, aided by Turkish economic and military support.7 4
Today, "[a]ll governments, except that of Turkey, and all
international and regional organizations recognize only the
Republic of Cyprus, its sovereignty, unity, and territorial
integrity .... [T]his consistent international position has been
reaffirmed by numerous resolutions and actions."
In addition to supporting the creation of the TRNC, Turkey has
encouraged Turkish citizens to relocate to Cyprus "under a
deliberate Turkish government policy intended to alter the
demography of the [TC] community and of Cyprus as a whole."7 1
Outnumbering TCs two to one, an estimated 160,000 Turkish
settlers, many of whom have completed military service in
71 See BARTLETr, supra note 2, at 95.
72 See ANASTASIOU, supra note 24, at 123; see also BARTLETT, supra note 2, at 19.
73 COUFoUDAKIs, supra note 2, at 60, 62 (listing some additional reasons that the
enclaved left, including restrictions on communication and inheritance rights).
74 See ANASTASIOU, supra note 24, at 102.
75 COUFOUDAKIS, supra note 2, at 1; see also THE CYPRUS ISSUE, supra note 14, at
371-72 (quoting U.N. Security Council Resolution 541, which states that "the attempt to
create a 'Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus', is invalid, and will contribute to a
worsening of the situation in Cyprus," and urges "all States not to recognize any Cypriot
state other than the Republic of Cyprus" and to "refrain from any action which might
exacerbate the situation").
76 COUFOUDAKIS, supra note 2, at 4, 80-82.
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Turkey, have relocated to Cyprus." Home to an estimated 40,000
Turkish troops, northern Cyprus has one soldier for every six
civilians. 7" To facilitate the settlers' relocation, the Turkish
government provided them with various incentives, including
citizenship in the TRNC, employment opportunities, housing, and
property ownership. 79 The Republic's entry into the EU also
contributed to the influx of settlers, as many hoped to benefit from
EU membership by moving to Cyprus.so
The division of the island has suppressed the economic growth
of both the TRNC and the Republic, leading to a high level of
unemployment and a GDP that is merely two-thirds of what it was
prior to 1974." The lingering economic effects are much more
pronounced in the TRNC; for example, the per capita GC income
exceeds the per capita TC income five to one.82 The reason for the
extreme disparity can be attributed to an internationally recognized
economic embargo that was placed on northern Cyprus following
the invasion by Turkey and the establishment of the TRNC." Due
to the embargo, the Turkish north became reliant on financial aid
from Turkey, establishing the Turkish lira as their monetary unit
and adopting the Turkish language.8 4 This reliance on Turkey:
retarded economic development and ... Northern Cyprus
became dependent on an artificially sustained economy
through direct state aid from Turkey. In the name of
physical security and political independence, the TC
community was compelled to bear economic stagnation
and regression, and, most importantly, isolation and
exclusion from direct international commerce and trade."
77 See id. at 80-82 (noting that the TC population in Cyprus has declined from
around 114,000 TCs in 1974 to only around 80,000 TCs, in part due to the depressed
economy in northern Cyprus); see also ANASTASIOU, supra note 24, at 123 (estimating
the number of Turkish settlers at 80,000).
78 See CouFouDAKIs, supra note 2, at 4, 81.
79 See id at 82 (noting that as of the year 2000, over 30,000 title deeds were given
to Turkish settlers, including titles to properties that belonged to GCs).
80 See id.
81 See id at 4.
82 See ANASTASIOU, supra note 24, at 10.
83 See id
84 See id; see also COUFOUDAKIS, supra note 2, at 4.
85 ANASTASIOU, supra note 24, at 10.
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Further, the economic effects of the division, along with
inadequate housing, medical facilities, and schools, have hindered
progress in Cyprus."6
Since 1974, there have been various proposals for resolving
the Cyprus Problem, yet all have failed.17 The GC position has
steadily weakened as TC bargaining power has increased due to
the realities of the situation; more recent settlement proposals call
for greater autonomy for TCs than earlier proposals rejected by
GCs." When Cyprus began negotiating for accession to the EU,
settlement efforts increased. Turkey initially believed the EU
would reject Cypriot membership rather than "risk provoking a
crisis with Turkey, a major state with 60 million people."89 When
it became evident that Cyprus was a serious candidate for
admission, new talks began between the TCs and GCs, with the
EU indicating that although "it would prefer to see a united
Cyprus join, . . . if that were not possible a divided island would
still become a member."90 Given the EU's willingness to admit
Cyprus even without resolution of the Cyprus Problem, Turkey
became more amenable to a reunification of Cyprus.91 Desiring
EU membership itself, Turkey realized that the Cyprus Problem
posed an obstacle in its path.92
After Kofi Annan, the Secretary-General of the U.N. at the
time, became involved in the settlement process in 2004, the U.N.
presented the Annan Plan, designed to create a "United Cyprus
Republic" ("UCR") by "emphasizing conflict resolution and
cooperation over societal cohesion."9 3 The plan anticipated that
86 See COUFOUDAKIS, supra note 2, at 4.
87 See generally Ker-Lindsay, supra note 19, at 16-21 (summarizing some of the
proposed solutions).
88 See id at 20-21 (noting, for example, that the children of Turkish settlers who
arrived in northern Cyprus in the 1970s have been raised in Cyprus and call it home; as a
result, the international community recognizes that dealing with the problems in Cyprus
today may require acceptance of some of the changes in demography, settlement
patterns, and culture that have occurred in the last thirty-five years).
89 Id. at 19.
90 Id. at 19; see also COUFOUDAKIS, supra note 2, at 2.
91 See ANASTASIOU, supra note 24, at 30-31.
92 See Ker-Lindsay, supra note 19, at 19-20.
93 Christala Yakinthou, Consociational Democracy and Cyprus: The House that
Annan Built? in REUNIFYING CYPRUS: THE ANNAN PLAN AND BEYOND 25 (Andrekos
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the UCR would be "an indissoluble partnership between the
federal government and two equal constituent states." 94  Each
would have powers related to administration at the state and
federal level, and the focus would be on shared governmental
decision-making and contribution. 95 To be acceptable to both
communities, the Annan Plan attempted to balance individual
property rights and the need for refugees to return home with the
recognition that over thirty years had passed since the invasion and
the refugees' former homes had new inhabitants, some of whom
were also refugees.9 6 An impartial property board composed of
GCs, TCs, and independent foreign nationals would be created to
hear claims and allow applicants to choose between receiving
compensation for property or obtaining full restitution and
reinstated possession of property if feasible.97 Additional options
included participating in the sale, exchange or long-term lease of
property.9 8
The Annan Plan would also have led to the withdrawal of all
pending cases brought by GCs against Turkey in the ECHR
without the consent of the applicants.9 9 Critics believed that this
Varnava & Hubert Faustmann eds., 2009); see also Ker-Lindsay, supra note 19, at 20.
94 Yakinthou, supra note 93, at 26; see also EROL KAYMAK ET AL., BUILDING
CONFIDENCE IN PEACE: PUBLIC OPINION AND THE CYPRUS PEACE PROCESS 1 n.2 (2008);
Demopoulos, 50 EUR. CT. H.R. § 8.
95 See Yakinthou, supra note 93, at 25-26; see also BARTLETr, supra note 2, at 100-
10.
96 See MICHAEL FISCHBACH, THE PEACE PROCESS AND PALESTINIAN REFUGEE
CLAIMS: ADDRESSING CLAIMS FOR PROPERTY COMPENSATION AND RESTITUTION 102
(United States Institute of Peace Press 2006); see also Demopoulos, supra note 9, § 10
(indicating that the plan would limit the number of Turkish settlers eligible for
citizenship).
97 See Demopoulos, 50 EUR. CT. H.R. § 14.
98 See FISCHBACH, supra note 96, at 102-03; see also Demopoulos, 50 EUR. CT.
H.R. §§ 11-14 (describing the provisions of Article 10 of the Annan Plan, which dealt
with the resolution of property claims).
99 See COUFOUDAKIS, supra note 2, at 17; see also Demopoulos, 50 EUR. CT. H.R. §
15 ("Article 5 (2) of Annex VII required that the 'United Cyprus Republic . .. pursuant
to Article 37 of the European Convention on Human Rights . . . and invoking the fact
that the Foundation Agreement is providing a domestic remedy for the solution of all
questions related to affected property, inform the European Court of Human Rights ...
that the United Cyprus Republic shall therefore be the sole responsible State Party and
request the Court to strike out any proceedings currently before it concerning affected
property in order to allow the domestic mechanism agreed to solve these cases to
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aspect of the Annan Plan, which would have allowed a political
settlement to take precedence over pending ECHR claims, would
have "been a significant blow to the credibility of the
[C]onvention and of the European Court of Human Rights.""'o
On April 24, 2004, the Plan was put to referendum in both the
GC and TC communities.o' Although sixty-five percent of voting
TCs were in favor of the Plan, seventy-five percent of voting GCs
opposed the Plan.102 The failure of the Annan Plan has led to an
increasing belief that resolution of the conflict must stem from
Cypriot-driven negotiations, with the international community
playing mainly a secondary role."0 3 Soon after the failure of the
Annan Plan, Cyprus entered the EU on May 1, 2004 as a divided
nation.10 4
In May 2008, the President of the Republic, Demetris
Christofias, and the President of the TRNC, Mehmet Ali Talat,
stated they would work to create "a bi-zonal and bi-communal
federation, with a single international personality and with a Greek
Cypriot and a Turkish Cypriot constituent state enjoying equal
status."'0o However, whether resolution will occur remains to be
seen.o' Recent opinion polls indicate that the majority of Cypriots
admit that both communities are somewhat at fault and that a
peaceful solution is necessary.'0 7 Only a minority of Cypriots are
proceed."').
100 CouFouDAKIs, supra note 2, at 17.
101 See Alexandros Lordos, Rational Agent or Unthinking Follower? A Survey
Based Profile Analysis of Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot Referenda Voters, in
CYPRUS: A CONFLICT AT THE CROSSROADS 17, 17 (Thomas Diez & Nathalie Tocci eds.,
2009); see also BARTLETT, supra note 2, at 125; KAYMAK ET AL., supra note 94, at 1.
102 See BARTLETr, supra note 2, at 138; cf Demopoulos, 50 EUR. CT. H.R. § 16
(calculating that due to the limitations in the Annan Plan, less than six percent of the
population would be able to return to their homes by the ninth year of the Plan and less
than twenty percent by the nineteenth year or upon Turkey becoming a member of the
EU).
103 See KAYMAK ET AL., supra note 94, at 2.
104 See COUFOUDAKIS, supra note 2, at 2; cf KAYMAK ET AL., supra note 94, at 29
(describing new developments in the peace process since March 2008).
105 KAYMAK ET AL., supra note 94, at 29.
106 See Robert Rotberg, Reunifying Cyprus: Essential Challenges, in REUNIFYING
CYPRUS: THE ANNAN PLAN AND BEYOND 251, 259 (Andrekos Varnava & Hubert
Faustmann eds., 2009).
107 See KAYMAK ET AL., supra note 94, at 10.
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completely satisfied with the status quo.' Despite this progress, a
substantial minority of the population remains committed to the
prejudices of the past,' and over half of surveyed GCs and TCs
viewed themselves as being Cypriot only to the same or a lesser
degree than they viewed themselves as being, respectively, Greek
or Turkish."0
In the latest TRNC presidential election, Dervi Eroglu
succeeded Mehmet Ali Talat."' Frustrated by the lack of progress
in negotiations, Eroglu has expressed his belief that "we have no
choice but to seriously evaluate our own options on whether to
carry on with talks forever-for the sake of talking-or to stop
lying to ourselves and start considering other options if we have
no solution by the end of [2010]." 112 Many Cypriots do not
believe the current negotiations will resolve the conflict."'
III. An Introduction to the European Court of Human Rights
A. History and Jurisdiction
In 1949, the Council of Europe ("Council") was founded by
ten countries; today, the Council has forty-seven member nations
and "seeks to develop throughout Europe common and democratic
principles based on the European Convention on Human
Rights."11 4  All members of the Council are signatories to the
108 See id. at 11-12 (finding that eighty-four percent of TCs and seventy-five percent
of GCs are either dissatisfied with the status quo or have mixed feelings about it).
109 See id. at 10-13 (revealing that substantial minorities of both communities would
be opposed to having a member of the other community as their neighbor).
110 See id at 7.
111 See Simon Bahceli, Turk Cypriot Leader Says Talks Last Chance, REUTERS
(Sept. 16, 2010, 10:10 PM), http://in.reuters.com/article/idlNIndia-51547220100916.
112 Abdullah Bozkurt, Turkish Cypriot Leader Warns He Is Serious About Year's
End Deadline, TODAY'S ZAMAN (Sept. 20, 2010), http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-
web/news-222111-102-turkish-cypriot-leader-warns-he-is-serious-about-years-end-
deadline.html.
113 See KAYMAK ET AL., supra note 94, at 28 (describing polls finding that over half
of TCs are "not at all hopeful" that the current negotiations will achieve resolution
compared to twenty-nine percent of GCs; under twenty percent of each group are "very
hopeful").
114 The Council of Europe in Brief COUNCIL OF EUROPE,
http://www.coe.int/aboutCoe/index.asp?page=quisommesnous&l=en (last visited Mar.
26, 2011) [hereinafter The Council ofEurope]; see also COUFOuDAKIS, supra note 2, at 9
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Convention, as are all members of the EU. "s To ensure
compliance with the Convention, the Council established the
ECHR in 1959. The ECHR provides recourse to both states and
individuals in the event that a violation of the Convention has
occurred."6
An interstate case may be brought under Article 33 of the
Convention in the event that states "have determined not only that
violations of the convention have occurred by another member but
also that traditional diplomatic and political methods have not
remedied the situation." 17 Article 34 provides for individual
appeals to the ECHR with no requirement that the member state
consent before the appeal can be brought."' However, "[i]n all
cases before a Chamber [of the ECHR],... a High Contracting
Party one of whose nationals is an applicant shall have the right to
submit written comments and to take part in hearings."" 9
Before the ECHR considers a claim's merits, there must be a
threshold finding of admissibility.'2 0 Prior to 1998, the European
Commission of Human Rights ("European Commission")
determined whether applications against member states were
admissible and "expressed an opinion" relating to the merits of the
case. 121 After the ratification of Protocol 11, the European
(observing that the Convention was created in 1950 and implementation began in 1953).
115 See The Council ofEurope, supra note 114.
116 See J.G. MERRILLS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS I (Gillian White ed., 1993).
117 COUFOUDAKIS, supra note 2, at 10-11; see also Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms as amended by Protocols No. 11 and 14, art.
33, Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 ("Any High Contracting Party may refer to
the Court any alleged breach of the provisions of the Convention and the protocols
thereto by another High Contracting Party.") [hereinafter Convention].
118 See Convention, supra note 117, art. 34 ("The Court may receive applications
from any person, non-governmental organisation or group of individuals claiming to be
the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in
the Convention or the protocols thereto. The High Contracting Parties undertake not to
hinder in any way the effective exercise of this right."); see also COUFOUDAKIS, supra
note 2, at 10-11 (outlining the historical evolution of what is now Article 34").
119 Convention, supra note 117, art. 36(1).
120 See id. art. 35.
121 See EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, 50 YEARS OF ACTIVITY THE EUROPEAN
COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS - SOME FACTS AND FIGURES 3 (2010), available at
http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/65172EB7-DElC-4BB8-93Bl-
2011] 705
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
Commission was dissolved into the ECHR, and today, cases are
heard exclusively by the ECHR.'22 The jurisdiction of the ECHR
"extend[s] to all matters concerning the interpretation and
application of the Convention and the protocols."1 23 Despite the
broad grant of jurisdiction, the ECHR's ability to review a case is
limited by provisions such as the exhaustion of remedies
requirement in Article 35 of the Convention. Under Article 35, an
application is inadmissible unless the petitioners have exhausted
any adequate and effective domestic remedy available prior to
pursuing review by the ECHR.124
Since Cyprus ratified the Convention as a unified republic in
1962, the ECHR views the Convention as applicable to the entire
island of Cyprus.125 As a result, "the ECHR considers northern
Cyprus as a territory in which the individual rights and freedoms
set out in the Convention must still be safeguarded."1 26 Turkey
ratified the Convention in 1954 and is, therefore, also obligated to
abide by its provisions.127 Even so, Turkey remains the only state
that has failed to comply with an ECHR judgment on an interstate
application.128 As Turkey wishes to join the EU, it may no longer
be able to avoid compliance without jeopardizing its chances for
membership.129 All EU members are signatories to the Convention
and are required to meet certain human rights standards before
they are allowed to join.' To satisfy this requirement, Turkey
may need to demonstrate its desire to comply with ECHR
judgments and to remediate its violations of the Convention."'
B28676C2C844/0/FactsAndFiguresEN.pdf [hereinafter FACTS AND FIGURES].
122 See COUFOUDAKIS, supra note 2, at 10.
123 Convention, supra note 117, art. 32.
124 See id. art. 35 ("The Court may only deal with the matter after all domestic
remedies have been exhausted, according to the generally recognised rules of
international law, and within a period of six months from the date on which the final
decision was taken.").
125 See Ozersay & Giirel, supra note 8, at 275.
126 Id
127 See COUFOUDAKIS, supra note 2, at 33.
128 See id. at 11-12.
129 See id at 12.
130 See id. at 33-34.
131 See FACTS AND FIGURES, supra note 121, at 4-5 (noting that around eleven
percent of the cases (over 13,100) pending before the ECHR as of January 2010 were
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B. Enforcement by the Committee of Ministers
The ECHR's decisions are declaratory in nature, with the
Court determining whether a violation of the Convention has
occurred and issuing a binding judgment to the parties.13 2 When a
state is found to have committed a violation, the Committee of
Ministers ("Committee") receives the Court's final judgment and
supervises its execution.'33 The state must keep the Committee
apprised of its efforts to remedy the violation, and the Committee
examines the steps taken by the state, retaining authority over the
case until satisfactory measures have been implemented.13 4 The
Committee's presence "as a political force applying, if necessary,
political pressure on respondent States, . . . can be crucial to
ensuring that the Court's judgments do not remain a dead letter
that they might, potentially, otherwise be."l3 5
For a judgment to be executed fully, the violation must cease,
the victim must be restored to his pre-violation status to the extent
possible, restitution must be provided when appropriate, and future
violations must be prevented.136 The ECHR lacks the power:
lodged against Turkey, second only to Russia at around twenty-eight percent; nearly
nineteen percent of the Court's judgments have been against Turkey); see also
CoUFouDAKIS, supra note 2, at 11 (finding that ten of the twenty interstate applications
that the Council of Europe handled in its first fifty years involved Turkey, four of which
were brought by Cyprus as a result of the aftermath of the 1974 invasion); Ed Bates,
Supervising the Execution of Judgments Delivered by the European Court of Human
Rights: The Challenges Facing the Committee of Ministers, in EUROPEAN COURT OF
HUMAN RIGHTS: REMEDIES AND EXECUTION OF JUDGMENTS 49,90-91 (Theodora Christou
& Juan Pablo Raymond, eds., The British Institute of International and Comparative Law
2005) (referencing Turkey's failure to implement the ECHR judgments).
132 See Tom Barkhuysen & Michiel van Emmerik, A Comparative View on the
Execution of Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, in EUROPEAN COURT
OF HUMAN RIGHTS: REMEDIES AND EXECUTION OF JUDGMENTS, supra note 131, at 1, 3;
see also Convention, supra note 117, art. 46(1) ("The High Contracting Parties
undertake to abide by the final judgment of the Court in any case to which they are
parties.").
133 See Convention, supra note 117, art. 46(2); see also Barkhuysen & van
Emmerik, supra note 132, at 20; Murray Hunt, State Obligations Following from a
Judgment of the European Court of Human Rights, in EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN
RIGHTS: REMEDIES AND EXECUTION OF JUDGMENTS, supra note 131, at 25, 37 (Theodora
Christou & Juan Pablo Raymond, eds., 2005).
134 See Hunt, supra note 133, at 37.
135 Bates, supra note 131, at 50.
136 See Barkhuysen & van Emmerik, supra note 132, at 3; see also Hunt, supra note
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to quash national legislation or decisions which are
contrary to the ECHR, nor does it have the power to revise
final decisions of national courts .... issue certain orders
to the State party to the Convention ... [or] make
recommendations to the condemned State as to which steps
it should take to remedy the consequences of the treaty
violation.1 17
Rather, the state chooses how to comply with an ECHR judgment
within certain parameters and subject to the supervision of the
Committee. 138 Under the Convention system, "it is for the
Contracting States, in the first instance, to decide how best to
secure the substance of the Convention rights in their domestic
legal system, and also to choose the means by which they comply
with judgments of the Court." 139 Although restitution is the
preferred type of reparation, reparations can take the form of
compensation or satisfaction if restitution is not possible or would
be disproportionately burdensome in comparison with the
benefits.140
Despite the ECHR's limited role in dictating a state's method
of compliance with its rulings, Article 41 of the Convention
"empowers the Court to afford the injured party such satisfaction
as appears to it to be appropriate" if a state's domestic laws
provide for only partial reparations.14 As a result, the state must
133, at 32.
137 Barkhuysen & van Emmerik, supra note 132, at 3.
138 See id at 3-4; see also Hunt, supra note 133, at 37.
139 Hunt, supra note 133, at 25 ("It is well settled as a matter of Convention case
law that the Court of Human Rights has no jurisdiction under Article 41 to issue
directions to Contracting States on the measures or steps which they should take to
rectify violations. The Court has consistently considered that it is not empowered to do
so under the Convention, since responsibility for supervising the execution of judgments
lies with the Committee of Ministers . . . Judgments of the European Court of Human
Rights are 'essentially declaratory in nature, and leave to the state concerned the choice
of means to be used in its domestic legal system for the performance of its obligation' to
abide by the judgment. . . . The Court does not tell states how to remedy any violations
that it finds, and has always turned down requests for specific advice as to
measures . . . "); see also id at 31.
140 See id. at 28-29.
141 Hunt, supra note 133, at 32; see also Convention, supra note 117, art. 41 ("If the
Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the protocols thereto, and if
the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to
be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.").
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pay the amount awarded even if the payment is inconsistent with
its internal laws.14 2 The respondent state is afforded three months
to satisfy the judgment, and failure to do so during that period will
lead to the accumulation of interest on the judgment.'4 3 When
compliance is achieved, the Committee adopts a resolution to
indicate to the public that the state has fulfilled the judgment.'"
In addition to monitoring whether the judgment has been
executed in an individual case, the Committee determines whether
governmental reforms have occurred to ensure future
compliance. "' The Committee's role is ongoing "until it has
satisfied itself-on the basis of information supplied by the
State-that the State has fulfilled its obligations arising from the
judgment."' 46 hen a state fails to properly execute a judgment,
the Committee may take measures to encourage compliance such
as "political condemnation, suspension of the right to vote and
ultimately expulsion from the Council of Europe."' 47 Although the
majority of judgments are eventually executed, "more and more
States are becoming increasingly reluctant to execute judgments
against them and try to find ways to minimize the possible impact
of these judgments."'4 8 In the event that the judgment's proper
execution is being delayed or obstructed, the Committee may
adopt an Interim Resolution requiring certain measures to be taken
to address the violation.14 9 Interim Resolutions draw attention to
the failure of a state to execute an ECHR judgment and help
signify the Committee's commitment to ensuring compliance.'s
Although an individual party to a case "has no formal role" in
supervising enforcement, the party may attempt to engage the
Committee in overseeing execution.'"'
142 See Convention, supra note 117, art. 41.
143 See Bates, supra note 131, at 73.
144 See Barkhuysen & van Emmerik, supra note 132, at 20.
145 See id.
146 Id
147 Id. at 20.
148 Id
149 See Hunt, supra note 133, at 37-39.
150 See Bates, supra note 131, at 61.
151 Barkhuysen & van Emmerik, supra note 132, at 21; cf COUFOUDAKIS, supra
note 2, at 58 (criticizing the Committee as sometimes placing "political, security, and
economic priorities ahead of its responsibility to promote and protect human rights" and
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Even when the Committee determines that a judgment has
been fully executed, there are concerns that the lack of oversight
and increasing burdens on the Committee may obscure the fact
that a violating party has not actually complied with the ECHR
judgment. For example, the ECHR has held that it "is not willing
to override a decision of the Committee of Ministers that a certain
judgment has been properly executed," as the Committee alone
deals with the execution of judgments.152 Therefore, once the
Committee has deemed a judgment satisfied, the ECHR will not
revisit it or interfere with the Committee's finding. This
"inevitably opens up ... room for argument about whether a State
has done enough to comply with a particular judgment against
it."S 3 Moreover, as the number of member states increases, the
ability of the Committee to supervise the execution of judgments
will be greatly diminished.'5 4 Turkey's failure to comply with
ECHR judgments has highlighted the fact that the Court's
judgments are not always "unequivocally respected," and that
without adequate resources, the Committee's ability to combat
such instances of noncompliance may be limited."'
IV. The Role of the European Court of Human Rights in
Cyprus
The GC and TC viewpoints regarding the proper role of the
ECHR in the Cyprus Problem are fundamentally at odds with each
other. For example, the GCs view the Convention violations as an
issue of human rights that is divorced from the issue of a political
settlement and negotiations, whereas the TCs believe that the two
issues cannot be treated in isolation from each other, and that GC
attempts to appeal to the ECHR are counterproductive to a
comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus Problem.'"' Despite TC
noting that the Council of Europe has increased public pressure on the Ministers to
ensure compliance with the Convention).
152 Barkhuysen & van Emmerik, supra note 132, at 21 (referencing Olsson II v.
Sweden and the ECHR's inability or unwillingness to address a complaint that a previous
judgment was not executed).
153 Hunt, supra note 133, at 25.
154 See Bates, supra note 131, at 57-60.
155 See id. at 57-59. Noncompliance can have far-reaching consequences and can
undermine the effectiveness of ECHR judgments in general. Id. at 72.
156 See Ozersay & Giurel, supra note 8, at 274-75 (explaining further that U.N.
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opposition to the ECHR's involvement, many applications have
been filed by either Cyprus or individual GCs against Turkey in
recent years. 15 7 The GC government has been involved in all of
these judgments as either a party or as a third party intervening in
the application.'
Emphasizing that the TRNC controls northern Cyprus, Turkey
has defended these cases by claiming that it has not acted with
governmental authority in Cyprus and that it is not responsible for
Convention violations occurring on Cypriot soil.15 9 Rejecting this
argument, the ECHR has found that Turkey exercises "de facto
jurisdiction" in northern Cyprus.' As a result of Turkey's large
military presence in the region, the Court has held Turkey
responsible for the actions and policies of the TRNC. 161
Underlying the Court's reasoning was its fear that failing to hold
Turkey responsible would make it virtually impossible to
safeguard human rights in northern Cyprus.162
Consistently finding that Turkey's actions in Cyprus violated
multiple provisions of the Convention, the ECHR has issued
judgments in favor of GC applicants and awarded just
satisfaction.16 3 Nevertheless, overseeing the enforcement of the
ECHR judgments has been a particularly troublesome task for the
Committee.1 64 Turkey's noncompliance with the judgments and
its failure to prevent further violations of the Convention have
resulted in the ECHR addressing substantially similar issues in
negotiations treat GCs and TCs as political equals whereas the ECHR treats the GC side
as the sole government of Cyprus).
157 See id at 273; see, e.g., Xenides-Arestis v. Turkey, App. No. 46347/99, EUR. CT.
H.R. § 37 (2005) [hereinafter Xenides-Arestis 2005].
158 Ozersay & Girel, supra note 8, at 273.
159 See Loizidou 1997, 23 Eur. H.R. § 30; see also Ozersay & Gfirel, supra note 8, at
276.
160 See Loizidou 1997, 23 Eur. H.R. § 50; see also COUFOUDAKIS, supra note 2, at
38; see also Ozersay & Girel, supra note 8, at 277.
161 See Loizidou 1997, 23 Eur. H.R. § 50.
162 See Ozersay & Girel, supra note 8, at 277 (referencing the Republic's inability
to enforce the Convention in the TRNC).
163 See, e.g., See Loizidou 1997, 23 Eur. H.R.
164 See Bates, supra note 131, at 97 (stating that "[f]ull execution of the judgments
may never be possible" and that "the Convention system of human rights protection may
reach its limitations in the context of political situations").
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many GC applications, some of which would have been
unnecessary if Turkey had taken "appropriate general measures"
following the first judgment finding a violation.'6 5
There has recently been a new twist in ECHR case law
involving Cyprus. For a case to be admissible before the ECHR,
the applicant must have exhausted all viable domestic remedies
before filing an application.16 6 Until recently, the ECHR held that
the TRNC and Turkey had failed to provide an adequate remedy
and that GCs could bring their applications directly to the
ECHR.167 To be considered adequate, the remedy would have to
"be shown to offer individuals reasonable prospects of success in
preventing and/or redressing violations of the Convention."' 6 8 in
the 2010 Demopoulos decision, however, the ECHR concluded the
IPC was an adequate domestic remedy; as a result, the cases of
GCs who failed to apply to the IPC before filing with the ECHR
were inadmissible due the failure to comply with the exhaustion
requirement.169
The Demopoulos decision was in part necessitated by the vast
number of pending GC applications before the Court.17 0 Despite
Demopoulos, the ECHR and the Committee continue to play an
ongoing role in the Cyprus Problem. Not only are some of the
judgments issued by the ECHR prior to Demopoulos still
unexecuted, but Demopoulos only applies to GCs whose
applications had not been deemed admissible prior to the creation
of the IPC.17 1 Nonetheless, GCs fear that by allowing the TRNC
to create a remedy that can preclude the ECHR's jurisdiction,
there is a danger of the implicit recognition of the TRNC and of
165 See id. at 67-68.
166 See Convention, supra note 117, art. 35.
167 See Demopoulos, 50 EUR. CT. H.R. §§71-75, 127.
168 Ozersay & Gtirel, supra note 8, at 287.
169 See Demopoulos, 50 EUR. CT. H.R. § 127; Ozersay & GOrel, supra note 8, at
285.
170 See Demopoulos, 50 EUR. CT. H.R. § 69; see also Xenides-Arestis 2005, supra
note 157, §37 (commending the steps taken by the Government to provide an
opportunity for domestic redress for this applicant and others claiming similar violations
that have effectively satisfied the requirements for admissibility before the Court).
171 See Xenides-Arestis 2005, App. No. 46347/99 § 37; see also Demopoulos, 50
EUR. CT. H.R. §§ 63, 80.
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adverse consequences to their property rights. 17 2
A. The Law of the TRNC
Although the majority of land in northern Cyprus was owned
by GCs prior to the invasion, the land was subsequently
confiscated and issued to TCs and Turks settling in the region after
GCs fled south.1 13 Article 159 of the TRNC Constitution, enacted
in May 1985, attempted to formalize a change in ownership of the
property. 17 4 Article 159(1)(b) provides that:
[a]ll immovable properties, buildings and installations
which were found abandoned on 13 February 1975 when
the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus was proclaimed or
which were considered by law as abandoned or ownerless
after the abovementioned date or which should have been
in possession or control of the public even though their
ownership had not yet been determined. . . and. . . situated
within the boundaries of the TRNC on 15 November 1983,
shall be the property of the TRNC notwithstanding the fact
that they are not so registered in the books of the Land
Registry Office. 75
As a result of this Constitutional provision, GCs were determined
to no longer own their property in northern Cyprus, despite the
fact that they held title to the property." 6 However, the decisions
of the European Commission and the ECHR have "held that acts
by unrecognized political entities [such as the TRNC] were invalid
and in violation of the European Convention," confirming that
GCs remained the rightful owners and that Article 159(1)(b) failed
to transfer or alter ownership."
Despite the ECHR's finding in favor of GC ownership, the
TRNC issued invalid titles to these properties and allowed them to
be transferred or sold to third parties, including foreign
nationals.178 A construction boom in northern Cyprus resulted,
172 See Ozersay & Gilrel, supra note 8, at 285-86.
173 See COUFOUDAKIS, supra note 2, at 70.
174 See id.
175 TRNC Constitution art. 159(l)(b)-(c).
176 See Loizidou 1997, 23 EUR. CT. H.R. at 519-520.
177 COUFOUDAKIS, supra note 2, at 70.
178 See id at 70, 73 (listing evidence of the "massive scale of usurpation,
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bolstered in the early 2000s by the fact that approval of the Annan
Plan would have led to the withdrawal of pending property cases
against Turkey in the ECHR. 179 In response to the increased
construction and property sales, the government of the Republic
"undertook a massive information campaign . .. cautioning
foreign buyers about the risks of buying property in occupied
Cyprus ... Cypriot ambassadors have also communicated with
influential media [of other countries] . . . explaining the risks and
the law regarding illegal property purchases."' 80
Unable to return to their homes and concerned by the TRNC's
seizure and resale of their property, dispossessed GCs have filed
around 1,400 property cases in the ECHR against Turkey.'"' Due
to the large number of pending cases, the ECHR asked Turkey to
create a remedy to address its violations of the Convention in
Xenides-Arestis v. Turkey. 182 In part, the development of an
adequate remedy was a practical necessity due to the large number
of pending applications and the limited resources available to
ensure effective execution of ECHR judgments.'8 3
In June 2003, prior to Xenides-Arestis, the TRNC attempted to
provide a domestic remedy for GCs alleging violations of their
property rights by promulgating the "Law for the Compensation,
Exchange and Restitution of Immovable Properties Which are
Within the Scope of Sub-Paragraph (B) of Paragraph 1 of Article
expropriation, exploitation, and misappropriation of Greek Cypriot properties").
179 See id. at 70-71 (arguing that the Plan "encouraged illegal property transfers . . .
by severely restricting the right to restitution and by legalizing unlawful property
transfers that had taken place").
180 Id. at 71, 74-75 (alleging that the TRNC "used the distribution and sale of stolen
properties to buyoff political influence and to create dependence on the occupation
regime by settlers and Turkish Cypriots" to encourage settlement by Turkish citizens, to
attract foreign investment, and to discourage GCs from reclaiming their land).
181 See Ozersay & Girel, supra note 8, at 287.
182 See Xenides-Arestis 2005, App. No. 46347/99 § 5.
183 See Ozersay & Glrel, supra note 8, at 289; see also Demopoulos, 50 EUR. CT.
H.R. § 85 ("[T]he Court finds itself faced with cases burdened with a political, historical
and factual complexity flowing from a problem that should have been resolved by all
parties assuming full responsibility for finding a solution on a political level. This
reality, as well as the passage of time and the continuing evolution of the broader
political dispute must inform the Court's interpretation and application of the
Convention which cannot, if it is to be coherent and meaningful, be either static or blind
to concrete factual circumstances.").
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159 of the Constitution" ("2003 Law").184 Although the purpose
of the 2003 Law was to compel GCs to resort to a domestic
remedy prior to petitioning the ECHR,15 the ECHR made it clear
that a potential applicant was not required to exhaust domestic
remedies "if [the] available remedies are inadequate or ineffective,
or if the 'national authorities' have failed to investigate
misconduct or 'state agents' have inflicted harm."'1 6 The ECHR
found the proffered remedy to be inadequate in Xenides-Arestis,
and the 2003 Law was subsequently amended in December 2005
to address the ECHR's concerns.' The stated purpose of the
revised Law ("2005 Law") is:
to regulate the necessary procedure and conditions to be
complied with by persons in order to prove their rights. . .
to movable and immovable properties ... as well as, the
principles relating to restitution, exchange of properties,
and compensation .. . having regard to the principle of...
bizonality ... and without prejudice to any property rights
or the right to use property under the Turkish Republic of
Northern Cyprus legislation or to any right of the Turkish
Cypriot People which shall be provided by the
comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus Problem.18 8
The 2005 Law created the IPC189 and allowed all persons with a
claim to covered property to bring an application requesting
restitution, exchange, or compensation to the IPC within two years
of the law's passage.190 Individuals who applied to the ECHR
prior to the promulgation of the 2005 Law are entitled to apply to
184 COUFOUDAKIS, supra note 2, at 71.
185 See id. at 71, 73.
186 Id. at 73; Convention, supra note 117, art. 35.
187 See Xenides-Arestis 2005, App. No. 46347/99 §§ 5, 10; see also Ozersay &
Giirel, supra note 8, at 287; COUFOUDAKIS, supra note 2, at 73.
188 Law for the Compensation, Exchange and Restitution of Immovable Properties
Which are Within the Scope of Sub-Paragraph (B) of Paragraph I of Article 159 of the
Constitution, § 3 (2005) (TRNC), available at
http://www.kuzeykibristmk.org/dokuman/67-2005yasaING.pdf [hereinafter TRNC
Law].
189 See id. § 11(1).
190 See id. § 4(1); see also Demopoulos, 50 EuR. CT. H.R. § 35 (indicating that the
deadline for bringing a claim before the IPC has been extended to December 21, 2011).
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the IPC as well."' The applicant has the burden of proof and must
demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that the property was
registered in the applicant's name prior to July 20, 1974, or that he
or she inherited the property.19 2 Applicants must also prove that
they had to abandon their property "due to conditions beyond
[their] own volition."193 Furthermore, the individual currently
holding the rights to the property or the right to use the property
may participate in the IPC proceedings.'94 The IPC determines,
after reviewing the evidence, whether to provide restitution, offer
exchange for the property, or pay compensation; the IPC may also
award compensation for loss of use of the property or for non-
pecuniary damages. 19 5
Although the IPC purports to allow aggrieved GCs to choose
between restitution, property exchange, or compensation, "
restitution may not be available in all circumstances. 197 For
example, an immovable property that has not been transferred to
another "owner" can be restituted "provided that the restitution of
such property ... shall not endanger national security and public
order and that such property is not allocated for public interest
reasons and . .. is outside the military areas."' If the property
has been transferred to an individual, it may be restituted "[i]f the
increase in the value of the immovable property due to
improvement made on such property between the date it was
abandoned and the date of application .. . for restitution, is less
191 See TRNC Law, supra note 188, § 21.
192 See id § 6.
193 Id. § 6(6).
194 See id § 7.
195 See id. § 8; see also Demopoulos, 50 EuR. CT. H.R. § 36 ("The IPC has the
duties and powers to examine and reach decisions on applications, determine the amount
and method of payment of compensation, collect written or oral testimony or hear
witnesses, summon any person residing in the 'TRNC' to give testimony or produce any
document in his possession, to compel a person to give evidence or produce a document
in his possession, to award expenses to any persons summoned (section 13) . . . [In
addition, [tihe Ministry responsible for financial affairs must make provision under a
separate item of the Budget Law for each year for the payment of compensation awarded
by the IPC and other expenses incurred by the application of the Law (section 18).").
196 See Ozersay & Gilrel, supra note 8, at 287.
197 See id
198 TRNC Law, supra note 188, § 8(1).
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than the value of the property when it was abandoned" or if there
has been no increase in value; however, the property may not be
restituted if it has been "allocated for public interest or social
justice purposes," or if it is a property that a person received in
exchange for property he or she had to abandon in the South.199 In
addition to these limits on whether or not restitution is feasible, the
2005 Law also provides that:
the decision for restitution of such property nmay take effect
after the settlement of the Cyprus [P]roblem, in line with
the provision of the settlement. In such a case, the person
who is in possession ... of the property ... would have to
abandon the property ... unless such person has [not] been
provided with compensation or alternative accommodation
under the provisions of the settlement ... Natural or legal
persons who under the legislation of the Turkish Republic
of Northern Cyprus, are in possession or hold the
ownership of property to be reinstated after a settlement,
shall have the right to be compensated for the damage
caused by such a decision of the Commission.20 0
Because of this provision, property that is deemed subject to
restitution will not actually be returned to its original owners until
the Cyprus Problem is resolved, notwithstanding the decision of
the IPC.20 1 In addition, the 2005 Law provides that restitution may
not occur to the detriment of citizens of the TRNC without
compensation.20 2
Property that is more valuable now than it was at the time of
abandonment due to an improvement may not be restituted;
instead, exchange or compensation may be awarded as well as
damages for loss of use or non-pecuniary damages, if
applicable. 20 3 As most GCs wish to regain possession of their
property and to retain title, the limitations on restitution under the
2005 Law increase their concern that the focus of the IPC may be
primarily compensation and property-exchange rather than the
199 Id. § 8(2).
200 Id. § 8(2)(A).
201 See id
202 See id.
203 See id. § 8(3).
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desired restitution. 204 Consequently, the GC government has
rejected the IPC and encouraged citizens to do so as well.205
An applicant seeking compensation under the 2005 Law may
be awarded compensation and non-pecuniary damages based on
the property's market value on July 20, 1974, loss of income, and
any increase in the value of the property in the years since 1974
that is not based on an improvement to the property.206 An
additional relevant factor is whether the applicant possesses
property in southern Cyprus owned by TRNC citizens.20 7 Upon
receiving compensation or property exchange, 208 applicants "can
under no condition, make a claim of right of ownership" over the
property for which they have received compensation or exchange;
title is eliminated, and restitution is no longer an option.209 Parties
that find the decision of the IPC unsatisfactory are permitted to
appeal to the High Administrative Court and ultimately to the
ECHR.210
The IPC consists of a President, a Vice-President, and five to
seven Members21' appointed for five-year terms.212 The President
of the TRNC nominates the Members, and the Supreme Council of
Judicature chooses among the nominees.2 13 in order to prevent
bias and to increase legitimacy, the 2005 Law requires the
exclusion from IPC membership of "[a]ny person directly or
indirectly deriving any benefit from immovable properties on
which rights are claimed by those who had to move from the north
of Cyprus in 1974, abandoning their properties." 2 14 To further
ensure impartiality, the IPC is required to have at least two
204 See Ozersay & Gtirel, supra note 8, at 288; COUFOUDAKIS, supra note 2, at 69-70
(noting that one reason that the Annan Plan failed was that it provided for the resolution
of the property issue through compensation and property exchange rather than primarily
through restitution).
205 See Ozersay & Gtrel, supra note 8, at 288.
206 See TRNC Law, supra note 188, § 8(4).
207 See id.
208 See id § 8(5) (explaining the process of property exchange).
209 Id. § 10.
210 See id. § 9.
211 See id § 11(1).
212 See TRNC Law, supra note 188, § 12.
213 See id. § I1 (1)(A) (providing that Members may be re-elected).
214 Id. § 1 1(1)(B); see Ozersay & Giirel, supra note 8, at 287.
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Members who are not nationals of the TRNC, the United
Kingdom, Greece, Turkey, or the Republic. 2 15 However, despite
these provisions, decisions are made upon the vote of a simple
majority of Members attending the meeting. 216 Although two of
the individuals appointed to the IPC must be citizens of an
uninvolved nation, this provides little guarantee of neutrality as the
remaining Members could easily constitute a majority. 217
Similarly, even though individuals appointed to the IPC may not
have personally benefitted from abandoned GC properties, this
may be insufficient to safeguard GC rights and to ensure justice, as
few, if any, Cypriots are truly objective when it comes to the
Cyprus Problem.2 18
The decisions of the IPC are binding on applicants, subject to
the outcome of appeals. 2 19 The 2005 Law recognizes that some
individuals will not apply to the IPC and provides that their rights
"shall be determined and dealt with in accordance with the
framework and principles laid down in a political settlement
regarding the Cyprus issue." 2 20
As of November 2009, 433 cases had been brought before the
IPC, eighty-five of which had been resolved, mostly by "friendly
settlement." 221 Compensation has overwhelmingly been the
method of resolution, with over seventy claims being settled in
this manner for a total of about E 47 million; restitution as well as
compensation were provided for in four cases, property exchange
in two, and restitution upon the political settlement of the Cyprus
problem in one.222
In Demopoulos, the ECHR determined that the redress
provided for by the TRNC in the 2005 Law constitutes an
"efficient domestic remedy" as required by the Convention.22 3
Since the Court found the IPC to be satisfactory, cases pending
215 See TRNC Law, supra note 188, § 11(1).
216 See id. §§ 11(2), 14.
217 See id. §§ 11(1)-(2).
218 See id. § 1 1(1)(B); see Ozersay & Gilrel, supra note 8, at 286-87.
219 See TRNC Law, supra note 188, §§ 11(2), 14.
220 Id. § 19.
221 Demopoulos, 50 EUR. CT. H.R. § 40.
222 See id.
223 Id. § 127.
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before the ECHR will be redirected to the IPC, and the ECHR will
no longer be available to GCs who have not exhausted the IPC as
a domestic remedy.224 GCs believe that this finding may "conceal
the 'illegality' of the TRNC and lead to less international pressure
on Turkey despite the presence of its military troops in Cyprus."225
However, the ECHR was clear that acceptance of local remedies
was not to be confused with acceptance of the TRNC.2 ' As the
ECHR "has confined itself to ruling to uphold the Convention's
'object and purpose,' namely the protection of individual human
rights," rather than to consider the political arguments of each
side, the ECHR is less concerned with the legality of the TRNC as
the provider of the remedy than with the nature and scope of the
remedy itself.227
B. The Early Applications
The role of the ECHR and the European Commission in
Cyprus began to take shape soon after the Turkish invasion.
Although these early decisions did not emphasize property
violations as much as subsequent cases, they are useful to
understanding the ECHR's approach to the Cyprus Problem and
the framework within which the ECHR made its decisions. In
Cyprus' first two interstate applications against Turkey in the
1970s, the European Commission found that GCs had been
deprived of their possessions and evicted under the order of
Turkey; according to the European Commission, the purpose of
Turkey's actions was "to create fear, to force the Greek Cypriots
to leave for the safety of the government-controlled areas, and to
eradicate the Greek Cypriot cultural heritage in the occupied
areas." 228 The European Commission found evidence of repeated
rapes of GC women and children2 29 and that "these rapes were not
isolated cases of indiscipline," as there was no evidence that the
Turkish authorities acted to discipline rapists or to prevent future
224 See Ozersay & Gilrel, supra note 8, at 287-88.
225 Id. at 288.
226 See CouFouDAKIs, supra note 2, at 72; Demopoulos, 50 EUR. CT. H.R. § 96.
227 Ozersay & Giarel, supra note 8, at 289.
228 COUFOUDAKIS, supra note 2, at 42.
229 See id at 43 (revealing that rape victims ranged in age from twelve to seventy-
one and included pregnant and mentally disabled persons).
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rapes. 230  As a result, the European Commission found Turkey
guilty of violating Article 3 of the Convention, which prevents
torture and inhumane or degrading treatment. 231 In addition,
Turkey violated the "right to life" safeguarded by Article 2 of the
Convention as there was evidence that unjustified "killings were
committed on a 'substantial scale."' 232 Individuals held in
captivity were denied food, water, and medical treatment, and
there was evidence of torture of civilians held in Turkish detention
even after hostilities ceased.233
The European Commission noted that although GCs were
detained in both Cyprus and in Turkey after being deported,
Turkey had failed to provide complete lists of detainees and had
violated Article 5, which protects the right to liberty and security
of the person. 23 4 The European Commission also found that GC
property was taken and that no sufficient remedies were
available. 235 In later cases, the European Commission found
violations of the nondiscrimination provisions of the Convention 236
and continuing violations of Article 2 due to Turkey's failure to
investigate the fate of the missing GCs effectively.23 7
The modem era of ECHR cases began with Loizidou v. Turkey.
Although many GC applications have asserted violations of the
Convention's provisions regarding humane treatment, the Court's
main focus has been on violations of GC property rights.
230 See id. ("Evidence was also presented where women . . . were collected and
placed in separate rooms of empty houses to be raped repeatedly by Turkish soldiers
including officers. Some rapes took place in the presence of family members and other
children.").
231 See id.
232 Id. at 44 (finding that these killings included bombing raids on hospitals and
other civilian targets where napalm was used).
233 See id at 44-45.
234 COUFOUDAKIS, supra note 2, at 46, 54 (describing the European Commission's
finding that a number of missing GCs had been identified as Turkish prisoners and that
"there was a 'presumption of responsibility' by Turkey for the fate of persons in its
custody").
235 See id at 75.
236 See id. at 76.
237 See id at 55 ("Turkey had a positive obligation to conduct effective
investigations of its own . .. [which] could not be discharged by contributing to the work
of the CMP.").
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C. Loizidou v. Turkey
Titina Loizidou was a GC who grew up in northern Cyprus
and continued to own land there despite her permanent residence
in Nicosia.23 8 Loizidou filed a petition with the ECHR in 1989,
claiming that Turkish forces prevented her from accessing her
property in northern Cyprus in violation of Article 1 of Protocol
No. 1 of the Convention.23 9 Loizidou also alleged that her right to
peaceful enjoyment of her possessions and her right to control and
use her property had been affected as she had had no access to it
since 1974.240 Although Loizidou did not reside in northern
Cyprus at the time of the invasion, she claimed that prior to the
occupation in 1974, she began work on a plot of land she owned in
Kyrenia, located in northern Cyprus, to build a home for her
family.24' As a result, Loizidou claimed that her Article 8 right to
respect for private and family life was violated.242
Turkey protested the fact that it was being held responsible for
events occurring within Cyprus; although it conceded that
Loizidou's loss of control and access to her property related to the
occupation of northern Cyprus and the existence of the TRNC, it
denied that it was responsible and claimed that Turkish forces in
Cyprus were "acting exclusively in conjunction with and on behalf
238 See Loizidou 1997, 23 Eur. H.R. at 518; see also Michalis Pasiardis, A City That
Waits, NICOSIA MUNICIPALITY,
http://www.nicosia.org.cy/english/lefkosia istoriapoliperimenei.shtm (October 1991)
(last visited Mar. 24, 2011) (explaining that Nicosia, the capital of Cyprus, straddles the
Green Line, with part of the city in the Republic and the other part in the TRNC).
239 See Loizidou 1997, 23 Eur. H.R. at 513; see also Convention, supra note 117,
art. 1, Protocol 1 ("Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of
his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest
and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of
international law."); COUFOUDAKIS, supra note 2, at 77.
240 See Loizidou 1997, 23 Eur. H.R. at 516.
241 See id. at 518.
242 See Loizidou v. Turkey, 20 EuR. CT. H.R. 99, 119 (1995) [hereinafter Loizidou
1995]; see also Convention, supra note 117, art. 8 ("Everyone has the right to respect for
his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. There shall be no
interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in
accordance with the law and is necessary ... in the interests of national security, public
safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime,
for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of
others.").
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of the allegedly independent and autonomous 'TRNC'
authorities." 24 3 Turkey claimed its troops were there with the
consent of the TRNC in order to provide protection for TCs and
that it did not exercise governmental authority in the region.24
The ECHR rejected this claim, finding:
[t]he concept of "jurisdiction" under Article 1 of the
Convention is not restricted to the national territory of the
Contracting States. Accordingly the responsibility of
Contracting States can be involved by acts and omissions
of their authorities which produce effects outside their own
territory. In conformity with the relevant principles of
international law governing State responsibility, the
responsibility of a Contracting State can also arise when as
a consequence of military action-whether lawful or
unlawful-it exercises effective control of an area outside
its national territory. The obligation to secure, in such an
area the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention,
derives from the fact of such control whether it be
exercised directly, through its armed forces, or through a
subordinate local administration.24 5
As northern Cyprus had over 30,000 armed Turkish forces
stationed in the region,24 6 the ECHR held it was justified in
finding that Turkey exercised "effective overall control" of
northern Cyprus.24 7 As a result, the ECHR concluded that there
was no need "to determine whether ... Turkey actually
exercise[d] detailed control over the . . . 'TRNC."' 2 48 The Court
imputed responsibility to Turkey for the TRNC's actions and
policies 249 and found "[t]hose affected by such policies or
actions ... come within the 'jurisdiction' of Turkey for the
purposes of Article 1 of the Convention;" therefore, Turkey's
243 Loizidou 1997, 23 Eur. H.R. at 515.
244 See id. at 529-30.
245 Id. at 515.
246 See id. at 519.
247 Ozersay & Giirel, supra note 8, at 276-77.
248 Loizidou 1997, 23 Eur. H.R. at 531; see also COUFOUDAKIS, supra note 2, at 77.
249 See Loizidou 1997, 23 Eur. H.R. at 532-33; see also COUFOUDAKIS, supra note 2,
at 77 (indicating the Court found Turkey, an occupying power, to be responsible for the
TRNC's actions as TC officials were a "subordinate local administration" of Turkey).
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obligations under the Convention extend to northern Cyprus. 250
The Court noted the lack of international recognition 25 1 of the
TRNC and determined that Article 159 of the TRNC Constitution
did not validly operate to remove title from GCs. 25 2 As a result,
Loizidou was still the legal owner of her land despite the TRNC's
attempt to claim title over all GC "abandoned" property in
northern Cyprus. 2 53  However, the ECHR indicated that certain
acts of the TRNC "could be considered valid by the Court if they
conformed with and served to uphold the purposes of
Convention." 254 The Court was careful to limit its interpretation to
discussing the reach of the Convention and "bypassed the
question" of the legality of the TRNC, finding there was no need
to consider the legality of the 1974 invasion in order to establish
state responsibility.2 55
Once the ECHR determined that Turkey could be imputed
with responsibility, it noted that Turkey had not recognized the
jurisdiction of the ECHR prior to 1990.256 As a result, jurisdiction
only extended to Loizidou's claim of a continuing violation of her
property rights since January 22, 1990, the date on which Turkey
accepted ECHR jurisdiction. 257 Although the TRNC's 1985
Constitution declared her land to belong to the TRNC, the Court
found that the denial of Loizidou's property rights could amount to
a continuing violation of the Convention.25 8
250 Loizidou 1997, 23 Eur. H.R. at 531; see also Ozersay & Giirel, supra note 8, at
275 (explaining that the Convention is "'an instrument of international law' that 'is not
concerned with the relations between states but with the rights of individuals"').
251 See Loizidou 1997, 23 Eur. H.R. at 520-21, 527.
252 See id at 514, 520, 527 ("It is evident from international practice and the
various, strongly worded resolutions that the international community does not regard
the 'TRNC' as a State under international law and that the Republic of Cyprus has
remained the sole legitimate Government of Cyprus-itself bound to respect
international standards in the field of the protection of human and minority rights.").
253 Id. at 527.
254 Ozersay & Gurel, supra note 8, at 282.
255 Id. at 281.
256 See Loizidou 1997, 23 Eur. H.R. at 521 (describing Turkey's recognition of the
jurisdiction of the ECHR pursuant to Article 46 in January 1990 and noting that the
ECHR found facts occurring prior to that date were excluded from its consideration).
257 See id. at 522-23.
258 See id. at 524.
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However, the ECHR determined that there was no violation of
Article 8 as her home was in Nicosia, rather than Kyrenia, at the
time of the invasion.259 Her plan to build a residence on the land
in the future was insufficient to constitute an Article 8 violation.2 60
As to the alleged violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, the
ECHR found that the denied access could be imputed to Turkey261
and that a breach had occurred.6 Though Loizidou remained the
owner of the land, she "has been refused access to the land since
1974, [and] she has effectively lost all control as well as all
possibilities to use and enjoy her property." 263 The Court found
that the "interference cannot . .. be regarded as either a
deprivation of property or a control of use . .. However, it clearly
falls within . .. an interference with the peaceful enjoyment of
possessions.,264 Additionally, the Court indicated that Turkey
failed to explain how the need to provide housing for TC refugees
"could justify the complete negation of the applicant's property
rights in the form of a total and continuous denial of access and a
purported expropriation without compensation."265 The ECHR
also noted that no effective local remedies were available.266
Loizidou claimed compensation for both pecuniary and non-
pecuniary damages, including her costs and expenses.2 67 Under
the Convention:
[i]f the Court finds that a decision or a measure taken by a
legal authority or any other authority of a High Contracting
Party is completely or partially in conflict with the
obligations arising from the . .. Convention, and if the
internal law of the said Party allows only partial reparation
259 See Loizidou 1997, 23 Eur. H.R. at 119 ("The fact that she is prevented from
returning to Kyrenia does therefore not affect her right to respect for her home within the
meaning of Article 8.").
260 See Loizidou 1997, 23 Eur. H.R. at 533-34.
261 See Loizidou 1997, 23 Eur. H.R. at 120.
262 See Loizidou 1997, 23 Eur. H.R. at 513.
263 Id. at 533.
264 Id
265 Id.
266 See CouFOuDAIs, supra note 2, at 77.
267 See Loizidou 1997, 23 Eur. H.R. at 534 (stating that Loizidou claimed pecuniary
damages for loss of income on the land and non-pecuniary damages of a punitive nature
against Turkey).
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to be made for the consequences of this decision or
measure, the decision of the Court shall, if necessary,
afford just satisfaction to the injured party.26 8
The ECHR ultimately ordered Turkey to pay Loizidou damages of
$1.5 million for the interference with her ability to use and enjoy
her property; in addition, Loizidou retained title to the property.269
It is important to keep in mind that compensation was provided
based only on the notion of a continuing violation present since
January 22, 1990; no compensation was provided for violations
occurring prior to that date. 270 The Court rejected Turkey's
argument that issues of compensation and property rights could
only be settled through bi-communal negotiations and that an
award of just satisfaction under the Convention would hinder a
settlement. 271 The Court also emphasized the difficulty in
determining the value of property given the "volatility of the
property market and its susceptibility to influences both domestic
and international."272
Despite the judgment, Turkey failed to comply within the
required three-month period following the Court's decision.273 As
a result, the Committee adopted an interim resolution emphasizing
that Turkey was required to fulfill the judgment in October
1999.274 After Turkey yet again failed to execute the judgment, an
additional resolution was passed nine months later stating that
Turkey had an "unconditional obligation" to abide by the court's
decisions.275 The Committee emphasized that by failing to satisfy
the judgment in the Loizidou case, Turkey displayed a "manifest
disregard ... of its obligations as a High Contracting Party and as
a member of the Council of Europe," which the Committee called
"unprecedented."2 7 6 A final interim resolution the following year
emphasized that the Committee would ensure that Turkey
268 Id.
269 See COUFOUDAKIS, supra note 2, at 77.
270 See Loizidou v. Turkey, App. No. 15318/89, 23 EUR. CT. H.R. CD5 § 31 (1998).
271 See id § 31.
272 Id. § 33.
273 See Bates, supra note 131, at 73.
274 See COUFOUDAKIS, supra note 2, at 79.
275 Id.
276 Id.
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complied with the judgment to the fullest extent possible. 277
Despite the public condemnation of Turkey, it appeared that the
parties "had reached a complete impasse with the Turkish
government disputing the decision outright and ignoring three
Interim Resolutions from the Committee of Ministers."27 8
However, Turkey ultimately complied "at the eleventh hour"
in December 2003, due to a threat of censure by the Council of
Europe 2 7 9 and the consequences that noncompliance would have
on its application for EU accession. 280 Following the substantial
judgment in Loizidou, Turkey and the TRNC became more
interested in developing a domestic remedy in order to preclude
ECHR jurisdiction. 281' Turkey did not want to risk additional
costly judgments and the political backlash associated with
Loizidou; as ECHR jurisdiction is predicated on the exhaustion of
domestic remedies, creating a mechanism to provide relief for GCs
seemed essential.28 2
D. Cyprus v. Turkey
Cyprus v. Turkey2m reaffirmed that the Republic was the sole
legitimate government of Cyprus and that the TRNC was an illegal
entity, albeit a "de facto authority."284 As a result, the ECHR
could hold Turkey responsible for ensuring that human rights were
protected in northern Cyprus and could also attribute any rights
violations committed by the TRNC to Turkey.285 In violation of
277 See id at 80.
278 See Bates, supra note 131, at 97.
279 BARTLETr, supra note 2, at 123.
280 See COUFOUDAKIS, supra note 2, at 77, 80; see also id at 20-21 ("Turkey could
not continue to defy the European legal order and expect that its EU accession path
would continue unhindered . . . Because Turkey sought accession talks with the EU, it
was compelled to pay Titina Loizidou the compensation and penalties imposed by the
European Court of Human Rights for the loss of use and enjoyment of her property.").
281 See id at 77.
282 See id. (asserting that as a result of Loizidou, "the urgency felt by the occupation
authorities to adopt a 'law' on domestic remedies" is understandable, especially given
the financial cost of the decision and the fact that over fifty comparable cases were
pending at the ECHR).
283 App. No. 25781/94 (2001), 35 EUR. CT. H.R. 30 [hereinafter Cyprus v. Turkey].
284 Id. §§ 61, 90.
285 See id. § 77.
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Article 13 of the Convention,2 86 the ECHR concluded that Turkey
and the TRNC had still failed to provide an effective domestic
remedy to GCs. 2 Finding the Property Compensation
Commission, a forerunner to the IPC, to be "futile or ineffective,"
the ECHR determined that GCs were not required to apply to it
before filing with the ECHR.288
However, the Court indicated that "where . . . remedies exist to
the advantage of individuals and offer them reasonable prospects
of success in preventing violations of the Convention, use should
be made of such remedies." 289  Regardless of the status of the
TRNC, the Court found there was a "need to avoid in the territory
of northern Cyprus the existence of a vacuum in the protection of
the human rights guaranteed by the Convention." Therefore, the
exhaustion of remedies requirement would apply in the event
Turkey or the TRNC developed an adequate and effective
remedy. 290 Rejecting the GCs' claim that any remedy developed
by the TRNC would be invalid, the Court emphasized that
recognition of a remedy provided by the TRNC would not equate
to a recognition of the legitimacy of the TRNC as a state.291' The
Court explained that "international law recognises the legitimacy
of legal arrangements and transactions in such a situation" and that
the TRNC's illegality would not prevent the Court from
implementing the exhaustion requirement of the Convention.29 2
Although the Court ultimately found multiple continuing
violations of the Convention, 293  Cyprus v. Turkey made it clear
286 See Convention, supra note 117, art. 13 ("Everyone whose rights and freedoms
as set forth in [the] ... Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a
national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons
acting in an official capacity.").
287 See Cyprus v. Turkey, 35 EUR. CT. H.R. §§ 193-94.
288 See id. § 99.
289 Id § 91.
290 Id
291 See id. § 238.
292 See id. § 86.
293 See COUFOUDAKIS, supra note 2, at 65-66 (describing Turkey's violations of:
Article 9 due to its treatment of the enclaved; Article 10 due to censorship; Article 1 of
Protocol No. 1 by failing to recognize rights of inheritance; Article 2 of Protocol No. I
by denying children access to secondary school; Article 3 for discriminatory treatment;
and Article 8 for violating right to private and family life and home); see also Bates,
supra note 131, at 96 (noting that the court found fourteen violations of the Convention).
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that as long as the TRNC instituted a remedy that would
adequately redress violations of the Convention, the fact that it
was created by the TRNC would not impede its viability.
E. Xenides-Arestis v. Turkey
In 1998, Myra Xenides-Arestis filed an application with the
ECHR claiming that Turkey had interfered with her Article 8
rights regarding respect for her home and her rights under Article
1 of Protocol No. 1294 Prior to the invasion, Xenides-Arestis and
her family lived in Famagusta in northern Cyprus.29 S In addition to
her home, she owned several plots of land, some of which were
rented to other parties.296 After the Turkish military forced her to
leave northern Cyprus, she was unable to return.297 As to her
Article 8 rights, Xenides-Arestis distinguished her case from
Loizidou's due to the fact that she actually lived in northern
Cyprus and had her home there at the time of the invasion.2 98
Turkey claimed the GCs' rejection of the Annan Plan in 2004
precluded Xenides-Arestis from alleging a continuing violation of
her rights. 299 The Court rejected this claim and reiterated that the
inter-communal talks between GCs and TCs could not be utilized
to justify a violation of the Convention.3 00 The Court also refuted
Turkey's assertion that "the award of compensation to individual
applicants such as the present one would seriously hamper and
prejudice negotiations for an overall political settlement, including
[settlement of] the complex property issue."01
294 See Xenides-Arestis 2005, App. No. 46347/99 §§ 1, 9, 16-17, 35.
295 See id § 10.
296 See id.
297 See id. § 11.
298 See id. §§ 16-17.
299 See id §§ 13, 27; see also Ozersay & Gilrel, supra note 8, at 278 (noting that
Turkey claimed it lacked jurisdiction in northern Cyprus and that the Annan Plan and the
international community had implicitly recognized the exclusive authority of the TRNC
in northern Cyprus).
300 See Xenides-Arestis 2005, App. No. 46347/99 § 20; Ozersay & Gdirel, supra note
8, at 278 (describing Turkey's argument that "in the present political situation, allowing
a displaced person to have full freedom of access to his/her property would undermine
the inter-communal talks" and providing compensation would undermine negotiations of
a bicommunal settlement).
301 Xenides-Arestis 2005, App. No. 46347/99 § 48.
7292011]
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
Turkey then challenged the ECHR's jurisdiction by alleging
that the TRNC had created a domestic remedy that Xenides-
Arestis had failed to exhaust; as a result, Turkey alleged that the
case should be inadmissible. 302 Turkey was referring to the
TRNC's 2003 Law, the predecessor to the 2005 Law creating the
IPC.3 03  However, the Court found that Turkey had failed to
demonstrate that the remedy was satisfactory under the
Convention or that it was sufficient to provide redress; therefore, it
rejected Turkey's objections to admissibility. 304 In part, the
Court's finding stemmed from the failure of the remedy to provide
for restitution of property in the event that it was feasible and the
fact that not all violations of the Convention would be
addressed.3 0
Despite the ECHR's finding that the remedy was inadequate,
the Court indicated that it was receptive to the efforts of Turkey
and the TRNC to create a domestic remedy and that they should
attempt to develop a remedy sufficient under the Convention.0o
Under Article 46 of the Convention, the Court noted that:
High Contracting Parties have undertaken to abide by the
final judgments of the Court in any case to which they are
parties ... [and when] the Court finds a breach ... the
respondent State [has] a legal obligation not just to pay ...
just satisfaction under Article 41, but also to select . .. the
measures to be adopted in their domestic legal order to put
an end to the violation . .. and to redress so far as possible
the effects."'
The Court indicated that the remedy chosen by the respondent
state must secure "genuinely effective redress for the Convention
violations identified in the instant judgment .. . as well as in
302 See Ozersay & Girel, supra note 8, at 286.
303 See Xenides-Arestis 2005, App. No. 46347/99 § 12; see also Demopoulos, 50
EuR. CT. H.R. § 50.
304 See Ozersay & GiUrel, supra note 8, at 279.
305 See id. at 286; see also Demopoulos, 50 EUR. CT. H.R. § 73 (indicating that the
2003 Law failed to satisfy Article 35 because it did not provide for compensation for
movable property, non-pecuniary damages, and restitution of property; in addition, it
failed to address violations of Articles 8 or 14, and it permitted the appointment of
committee members living on GC properties or land).
306 See Xenides-Arestis 2005, App. No. 46347/99 § 40.
307 Id. § 39; see also Convention, supra note 157, art. 46.
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respect of all similar applications pending before it."30 s Within
three months of a judgment by the ECHR, the remedy should be
available, and within six months, the redress should be given.30 9
As 1,400 property cases brought by GCs were pending before the
ECHR,310 the ECHR stressed that Turkey needed to introduce a
remedy that effectively protected rights safeguarded by the
Convention for all applicants."'
The court proceeded to find a continuing violation of Article 1
of Protocol No. 1 and of Article 8 due to the "complete denial of
the right of Greek-Cypriot displaced persons to respect for their
homes in northern Cyprus since 1974.",312 Echoing its decisions in
Loizidou and Cyprus v. Turkey, the court found that Xenides-
Arestis remained the legal owner of her property and that no
compensation had been paid to displaced persons regarding the
interference with their property rights.313
After the ECHR considered the merits of the case, the TRNC
attempted to rectify the shortcomings identified by the Court in the
2003 Law with the 2005 Law.3 14 The following year, the just
satisfaction portion of Xenides-Arestis was before the Court,
providing the ECHR with its first opportunity to consider the 2005
Law.3 " Turkey claimed that since the 2005 Law's enactment, nine
of the sixty applications that had been brought to the IPC had been
concluded, three of which awarded restitution.316 As a result,
Turkey believed that the IPC had been proven viable and that
Xenides-Arestis should be forced to submit her claim to the IPC
prior to appealing to the ECHR for just satisfaction.3 17
Noting that her application was deemed admissible before the
308 Xenides-Arestis 2005, App. No. 46347/99 § 40.
309 See id.
310 See id § 38.
311 See id. § 5 (conclusions).
312 See id. §§ 20, 32, 35 (deciding also that there was no need to consider whether
Article 14's prohibition against discrimination was violated since Article 1 of Protocol
No. 1 sufficiently addressed such violations).
313 See id. §§ 28, 30.
314 See Demopoulos, 50 EUR. CT. H.R. § 50.
315 See Xenides-Arestis 2005, App. No. 46347/99, § § 5, 10.
316 See id. §§ 10, 12.
317 See id. § 25.
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2005 Law's enactment, Xenides-Arestis claimed it was
inappropriate at this stage in the proceedings to decide whether the
IPC provided a proper domestic remedy."'1 Furthermore, Xenides-
Arestis argued that the 2005 Law was invalid.1 Under the 2005
Law, GCs were unable to retain title to their property once
compensation was paid or property exchange occurred; Xenides-
Arestis argued that this directly contradicted ECHR precedent
allowing GCs to receive compensation yet remain the rightful
owners of their property.3 2 0 The 2005 Law, therefore, set up a
mechanism whereby "compensation was paid as if lawful
expropriation had occurred." 32 ' She also alleged the new law
failed to require Turkey to cease violations and to restore GCs'
right to enjoy and occupy their property and possessions. 322
Pursuant to the 2005 Law, Xenides-Arestis believed that "the
legality of the interference with. . . [her] property and home was
unassailable before the 'TRNC' authorities." 3 23
Under the 2005 Law, the TRNC would provide restitution in
only a small minority of cases. Not only did the law itself severely
restrict restitution, but when restitution was in fact ordered, it
would occur only when there was a "comprehensive settlement of
the Cyprus Problem," making restitution dependent on political
events "despite the fact that the Law was supposed to provide a
legal remedy." 324 Xenides-Arestis herself would not be entitled to
restitution under the 2005 Law given the location of her
property. 325 Although the 2005 Law provided for property
exchange in certain cases, Xenides-Arestis attacked the TRNC's
authority to order exchange since doing so could potentially
jeopardize the rights of TCs in their property in the Republic.3 26
318 See id §§ 10, 12, 18.
319 See id. § 19.
320 See id. § 19, 33.
321 Xenides-Arestis 2005, App. No. 46347/99 § 19.
322 See id. § 20.
323 Id. § 21.
324 Id. § 22 (internal quotations omitted).
325 See id. (noting that Xenides-Arestis's home was located in a fenced-in area
under direct Turkish military control and that a recent TRNC court judgment held that
the area belonged to a Muslim religious trust rather than to GC refugees).
326 See id § 23.
732 [Vol. XXXVI
ANOTHER DOOR CLOSED
GCs seeking relief under the 2005 Law would also be limited in
the amount of damages they could receive because, unlike the
ECHR, the 2005 Law did not provide for the recovery of interest,
costs or expenses. 327
The Republic emphasized the limited nature of claims an
applicant could bring before the IPC and argued that "the criteria
according to which compensation was to be awarded were unfairly
and unduly limited and were not based on the principles set out by
the Court in ... Loizidou ... nor on international valuation
standards."32 8 Although the IPC was required to be constituted of
individuals who did not personally benefit from the displacement
of GCs, the Republic noted that some of the members of the IPC
had close relatives living on GC property and in GC homes.32 9
The Republic also claimed the presence of foreign members in the
IPC was inconsequential as a mere majority of two-thirds of the
members was sufficient to pass on a decision.3 30
In response, the Court stated that it "welcomes the steps taken
by the Government [of Turkey] in an effort to provide redress for
the violations of the applicant's Convention rights" and the rights
of other applicants. 331' According to the ECHR, the IPC had "taken
care of' the Court's requirements regarding a domestic remedy as
outlined in the preliminary objections to Xenides-Arestis and its
judgment on the merits.33 2 However, the Court determined that
Xenides-Arestis would not be required to apply to the IPC given
the advanced state of her case and the fact that the Court had
already rendered a decision on the merits.333
In addressing what damages to award Xenides-Arestis, the
Court acknowledged that there was "a considerable difference"
between the amount claimed by the applicant and the amount
offered by Turkey. 3' Although the Court emphasized the
uncertainties involved in valuing the claim, it ultimately awarded
327 See Xenides-Arestis 2005, App. No. 46347/99 § 23.
328 Id. § 32.
329 See id. § 34.
330 See id.
331 Id. § 37.
332 Id.
333 See Xenides-Arestis 2005, App. No. 46347/99 § 37.
334 See id. § 40.
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Xenides-Arestis E 800,000 in pecuniary damages, E 50,000 in non-
pecuniary damages, and C 35,000 in costs. 3 5 Xenides-Arestis also
retained the title to her property, and Turkey was ordered to
provide compensation for her loss of use and enjoyment of the
property. 3 36
F. Demades v. Turkey
In 1999, the ECHR ruled that John Demades' application
regarding property he owned in northern Cyprus was
admissible.33 In addition to owning a plot of land on the sea front
in Kyrenia, Demades owned a fully-furnished home that his family
regularly used as a second home. 338 Turkey challenged the
admissibility of Demades' application, claiming that due to
Demades' failure to apply to the IPC, he had not exhausted the
available domestic remedies. 33 9 The Court, however, found that as
it had already ruled on the admissibility of the application, the
government was estopped from objecting at this point in the
proceedings.34 0
In addressing Demades' claim that Turkey violated Article 8
of the Convention, the Court found that, although the home in
northern Cyprus was not his primary residence, "it may not always
be possible to draw precise distinctions, since a person may divide
his time between two houses or form strong emotional ties with a
second house, treating it as his home."3 41 As the Convention was
meant to be "a living instrument to be interpreted in the light of
societal changes and in line with present-day conditions," the
Court found that in these circumstances, the house in Kyrenia was
a home within the meaning of Article 8.342 Consequently, a
continuing violation of Demades' Article 8 rights had occurred
335 See id. §§ 42, 47, 54.
336 See COuFOuDAKIS, supra note 2, at 78.
337 Demades v. Turkey, App. No. 16219/90, EuR. CT. H.R. §§ 1, 6, 11 (2003)
[hereinafter Demades 2003].
338 See id § 11.
339 See id. § 15.
340 See id. §§ 16, 20.
341 Id. § 32.
342 Id. § 33.
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because he was denied "the right . .. to respect for his home."343
Because Turkey prevented the applicant from accessing, using, or
enjoying his property, the Court also found a continuing violation
of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. 344 Demades was ultimately
awarded E 785,000 for pecuniary damages, E 45,000 for non-
pecuniary damages, and E 5,000 for his costs and expenses. 3 5 in
addition, he was allowed to retain title to the property.3 46 Demades
reaffirmed the ECHR's decision in Xenides-Arestis that applicants
whose cases had been deemed admissible prior to the 2005 Law's
enactment would not be held to have failed to exhaust the
domestic remedies available to GCs in the event that they did not
apply to the IPC.3 47
G. Alexandrou v. Turkey and Settlement with the IPC
The ECHR declared Andromachi Alexandrou's application
admissible in 1999. 34 Although Alexandrou owned land in
northern Cyprus and possessed copies of the title deeds, she had
been unable to access her property since 1974.349
Denying its responsibility for Alexandrou's alleged injuries,5 o
Turkey argued that Alexandrou's failure to apply to the IPC
rendered her case inadmissible because she had not exhausted
available domestic remedies.35 1 According to Turkey, the IPC had
jurisdiction to award compensation for GC property in northern
Cyprus based on its market value in 1974 and could additionally
provide payment for loss of use, loss of income, and the increase
343 Demades 2003, App. No. 16219/90 § 37.
344 See id. § 46.
345 See Demades v. Turkey, Application No. 16219/90, European Court of Human
Rights HUDOC Portal §§ 25, 29, 36 (2008) [hereinafter Demades 2008].
346 COUFOUDAKIS, supra note 2, at 78.
347 See Demades 2008, App. No. 16219/90 § 20.
348 See Alexandrou v. Turkey, App. No. 16162/90, EuR. CT. H.R. §§ 1, 5 (2009)
[hereinafter Alexandrou Merits].
349 See id. §§ 8-9.
350 See id. §§ 11-12 (explaining Turkey's claims that it lacked jurisdiction over the
TRNC, and that since Alexandrou's property was expropriated before Turkey recognized
ECHR jurisdiction in 1990, it could not be held responsible for any purported
violations).
351 See id. § 13.
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in property value since that date.352
Alexandrou claimed the TRNC Law "aimed at providing a
false and illusory domestic remedy in order to avoid the property
claims of Greek Cypriots being adjudicated by the European Court
of Human Rights" and that given the stage of the proceedings and
the fact the IPC did not exist when her application was lodged, it
was an insufficient remedy.3 53 She further alleged the remedy was
discriminatory and incorrectly based on the notion that
expropriation of GC property by the TRNC was lawful. 35 4 In
response to Turkey's claim that she was no longer a victim due to
the availability of a remedy, she asserted that the remedy did not
recognize that the Convention had been violated and as a result, she
retained victim status. 355 The Republic intervened in Alexandrou's
case to emphasize that the 2005 Law did not provide redress for
Article 8 violations or other violations of the right to property and
that it was "incompatible with Articles 6, 13 and 14 of the
Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.",356
The ECHR agreed with Alexandrou, finding that as the case
had already been deemed admissible, objections to the Court's
jurisdiction could not be raised at this stage. 57 In response to
Turkey's claim that Alexandrou had failed to produce evidence of
her property ownership, the Court noted that the documents she
submitted were prima facie evidence that she possessed title and
that the burden was on Turkey to produce evidence to the
contrary. 3 58
The Court ultimately found a continuing violation of Article 1
of Protocol No. 135 and reserved the issue of damages for a later
352 See id. § 14.
353 Id. § 15.
354 Alexandrou Merits, App. 41355/98 § 15.
355 Id
356 Id. § 17.
357 See id. § 21.
358 See id. § 30; see also Gavriel v. Turkey, App. No. 41355/98, EuR. CT. H.R. §§
12, 17, 20, 25-26 (2009) (rejecting Turkey's claim that the applicant did not have title as
a result of Article 159 of the TRNC Constitution and instead finding that the certificate
of ownership issued to the applicant by the Republic was prima facie evidence of the
applicant's ownership in 1974, as the TRNC authorities possessed records relating to
title and were thus obligated to produce them in order to rebut the applicant's evidence).
359 See Alexandrou Merits, App. 41355/98 § 34.
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date.360 The ECHR's Turkish judge, Judge Karakay, dissented
from the opinion and argued that the exhaustion question should
not have been rejected by the Court, as well as that there was no
violation of Article 1 of Protocol 1.361 Karakay noted that the:
rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies is intended to give
Contracting States the opportunity to prevent or provide
redress for violations alleged against them before such
allegations are referred to the Court. That reflects the
subsidiary nature of the Convention system.
Faced with the scale of the problem of deprivations of
title to property alleged by Greek Cypriots (approximately
1,400 applications of this type lodged against Turkey), the
Court, in ... its Xenides-Arestis v. Turkey judgment of
22 December 2005, required the respondent State to
provide a remedy guaranteeing the effective protection of
the rights set forth in Article 8 of the Convention and
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 in the context of all the similar
cases pending before it. The State has a legal obligation
not just to pay those concerned the sums awarded ... but
also to select the general or, if appropriate, individual
measures to be adopted in its domestic legal order to put an
end to the violation found by the Court and to redress so
far as possible the effects. The Government submitted that
by enacting the Law on Compensation for Immovable
Properties ... and setting up a Commission ... it had
discharged that obligation.3 62
Karakas further claimed that although typically whether domestic
remedies have been exhausted is considered at the admissibility
stage, there are exceptional circumstances that justify deviation
from the general rule. 6 Under Article 35 of the Convention, the
ECHR can reject an inadmissible application at any stage despite a
prior finding of admissibility.364 According to Karakay, the TRNC
Law is "based on the guiding principles laid down by the Court in
the Xenides-Arestis case" and may be able to provide redress for
360 Id. §§ 54, 57.
361 See id. at app. (Karakay, J., dissenting).
362 Id.
363 See id
364 See id
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violations of the Convention in cases such as the one before the
Court.365
Following the Court's judgment on the merits in Alexandrou,
the ECHR was informed that a "friendly settlement" had been
reached between the TRNC and Alexandrou and that Alexandrou
no longer wished for the Court to consider her claims for just
satisfaction. 366 In November 2008, Alexandrou had filed an
application with the IPC requesting ten million Euros for loss of
use of the land. 36' The IPC ordered restitution of one of her
properties and authorized payment of f 1.5 million to compensate
her for the value of the properties and for loss of use. 368
Alexandrou requested that the Court strike the case so that
payment would become effective and informed the Court that she
considered the case settled and was content with the remedy
provided by the IPC.3 69 The Court stated that "[i]t is satisfied that
the settlement is based on respect for human rights as defined in
the Convention or its Protocols"3 70 and struck the remainder of the
case.3 7' Therefore, although the ECHR found a violation of the
Convention and was willing to consider the just satisfaction
portion of Alexandrou's case, the applicant's resort to the IPC
resulted in the case's dismissal.37 2
H. Demopoulos and Others v. Turkey
Prior to Demopoulos, the ECHR had spoken somewhat
favorably about the IPC; however, it had not analyzed the IPC or
considered whether it constituted an adequate and effective
domestic remedy. 373 In Demopoulos, the Court had its first
365 Alexandrou Merits, App. 41355/98 app. (Karakay, J., dissenting).
366 See id. § 7.
367 See id. § 10.
368 See id. § 13.
369 See id.
370 Id. § 17.
371 Alexandrou Merits, App. 41355/98 § 18.
372 See id §§ 6, 18; see also Eugenia Michaelidou Devs. Ltd. and Michael Tymvios
v. Turkey, EuR. CT. H.R., App. No. 16163/90, § 6, 13, 15, 17 (2008) (striking the case,
despite the finding of a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, after the applicant
accepted compensation and property exchange from the IPC thereby satisfying the
Court's need for an equitable settlement).
373 See Demopoulos, 50 EuR. CT. H.R. § 82 (explaining that although the Court in
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opportunity to review GC applications that had not been deemed
admissible prior to the TRNC's creation of the IPC.3 74 Alleging
violations of Article 8, Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, Article 14, and
Article 13, the petitioners in Demopoulos consisted of several
groups of GCs who had filed their applications with the Court
between 1999 and 2004. 375 As their cases had not yet been
deemed admissible, Turkey argued that the IPC was an effective
domestic remedy and that the applicants had to apply to it before
appealing to the ECHR.3 76 According to Turkey, Article 35 of the
Convention precluded GCs from using the ECHR as a court of
first instance.37 7
Without deciding the 2005 Law's adequacy, the ECHR
expressed approval of Turkey's and the TRNC's attempt to
provide GCs with a domestic remedy in Xenides-Arestis; the Court
even indicated that "the new compensation and restitution
mechanism, in principle, has taken care of the requirements of the
decision of the Court" requiring the creation of a remedy.37 8 As a
result of the Court's statements, Turkey and the TRNC believed
that they had been given the green light regarding the IPC,
although the ECHR had not yet ruled on whether it was
satisfactory.37 9 By the time of Demopoulos, Turkey noted that the
majority of applications to the IPC had been resolved by "friendly
settlement," and that no resort to the High Administrative Court
had been necessary thus far.380
The applicants in Demopoulos claimed that the exhaustion
requirement should not apply to them as the IPC was created after
they lodged their applications with the ECHR."' In addition, since
Xenides-Arestis had determined that the IPC appeared adequate, there had not been in-
depth analysis).
374 See id.
375 See id. §§ 41-43.
376 See id. § 64; see also id. § 68 (Article 35: "The Court may only deal with the
matter after all domestic remedies have been exhausted, according to the generally
recognised rules of international law, and within a period of six months from the date on
which the final decision was taken.").
377 See id. § 64.
378 See Xenides-Arestis 2005, App. No. 46347/99 § 37.
379 See Demopoulos, 50 EuR. CT. H.R. § 51.
380 See id § 54.
381 See id. § 58.
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the TRNC was an illegal entity, the applicants argued that it would
be inequitable to force them to resolve their property claims with
the IPC.3 82 Based on Turkey's refusal to comply with previous
ECHR judgments and the TRNC's failure to repeal Article 159 of
the TRNC Constitution, the GCs asserted that there had been an
"absence of any genuine commitment to remedying the systemic
defects.""'
As to the IPC itself, the applicants attacked the independence
of its members, the considerable exclusions that applied to
restitution, and the IPC's methods of calculating compensation.38 4
For example, they alleged the IPC had "a practice of radical under-
compensation," rarely granted restitution, applied "discriminatory"
valuation procedures, and imposed "undue obstacles" due to its
stringent requirements.
The Republic seconded the applicants' concerns about the
composition of the IPC because the TRNC President appointed its
members, many of whom were likely to have relatives or
acquaintances who benefited from occupation of GC properties.386
The Republic claimed that Turkey's position regarding the alleged
inadmissibility of the applications was "an attempt to legitimise
their unlawful mass appropriation of Greek-Cypriot properties,"
rather than an effort to remedy the violations of GC property
rights.8 By failing to abide by ECHR judgments, including the
judgment in Xenides-Arestis, Turkey "showed a continuing and
deliberate flouting of such judgments." 388 Despite Turkey's
382 See id
383 See id
384 See id § 58-60.
385 Demopoulos, 50 EUR. CT. H.R. § 60.
386 See id § 67.
387 Id. § 63; see also id. § 65 (reciting the Republic's argument that the 2005 Law
was void because it was created by a legislature that was unlawful and it was also based
on the TRNC Constitution, which the ECHR has indicated to be invalid); id § 67 (noting
that the Republic was concerned that by accepting compensation as an appropriate
remedy, it "would legitimise the compulsory acquisition of private property by an
aggressor State in occupation of another state's territory" and that "there was no means
of establishing a breach of Convention rights").
388 Id. § 63; see also id. § 80 (revealing that the applicants and the Republic claimed
that Turkey should not be able to benefit from the IPC given its unjustified delay in
complying with ECHR judgments).
740 [Vol. XXXVI
ANOTHER DOOR CLOSED
noncompliance, the ECHR was allowing it to "impose on the
people whose land it had occupied by force its own procedures for
complaints about its violations of human rights." 389 The
Republic's evidence indicated that a mere three to six percent of
actual losses were being redressed by resort to the IPC. 390
According to the Republic, the IPC constitutes:
essentially a "bargaining" process in which vulnerable
applicants were at a disadvantage, no reasons were given
[for the decisions], there were serious linguistic barriers,
delays, a lack of clarity as to which currency compensation
was being paid in (whether Cypriot pounds or pounds
sterling); an unjustifiable burden on applicants to prove no
other persons claimed rights in the property or that there
were no mortgage or charging orders on the property, as
well as the inappropriate imposition of a criminal standard
of proof beyond reasonable doubt and no provision for the
payment of legal costs and expenses.39 1
Turkey responded by claiming that the 2005 Law's validity "was
not affected by the fact it was created by [the] TRNC"3 92 and that
it remained an effective domestic remedy that applicants must
exhaust before resorting to the ECHR.3 93
Focusing on the supervisory nature of its role, the ECHR
emphasized that the protections of the Convention are "subsidiary
to the national systems safeguarding human rights" and that "it is
not a court of first instance."3 94 Consequently, applicants must
exhaust domestic remedies before the Court will entertain their
complaints, as "[s]tates are dispensed from answering before an
international body for their acts before they have had an
opportunity to put matters right through their own legal system."3 95
This is essential as the court:
does not have the capacity, nor is it appropriate to its
function as an international court, to adjudicate on large
389 Id. § 64.
390 Id. § 67.
391 Demopoulos, 50 EUR. CT. H.R. § 67.
392 Id. 55.
393 See id. § 57.
394 See id. § 69.
395 Id.
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numbers of cases which require the finding of basic facts
or the calculation of monetary compensation-both of
which should, as a matter of principle and effective
practice, be the domain of domestic jurisdictions. 96
The exception to the exhaustion requirement is that an applicant is
not required to exhaust remedies when they are "inadequate or
ineffective" or when the remedies available are illusory.3 97 The
ECHR has also noted that "the rule of exhaustion is neither
absolute nor capable of being applied automatically; in reviewing
whether it has been observed it is essential to have regard to the
particular circumstances of each individual case," including "the
general legal and political context in which they operate as well as
the personal circumstances of the applicants. "9
Ordinarily, the ECHR addresses whether an applicant has met
the exhaustion requirement with reference to the remedies in effect
as of the date of the application;3 99 however, the Court held that in
this instance, an exception was merited.400 Despite the illegal
occupation, the ECHR found that the TRNC's administrative,
legal, and judicial acts were not necessarily deprived of their
relevance under the Convention.40 ' The Court found that to hold
otherwise would be unrealistic and also potentially harmful to
inhabitants, as:
the key consideration is to avoid a vacuum which operates
to the detriment of those who live under the occupation, or
those who, living outside, may claim to have been victims
of infringements of their rights. Pending resolution of the
international dimensions of the situation, . . . it [is] of
paramount importance that individuals continue to receive
protection of their rights on the ground on a daily basis.
The right of individual petition under the Convention is no
substitute for a functioning judicial system and ...
396 Id.
397 Demopoulos, 50 EUR. CT. H.R. § 70 (explaining that an effective remedy must be
accessible and capable of providing redress).
398 Id
399 Id § 87.
400 Id. § 88.
401 See id. §§ 93-94 (referencing the "Namibia Principle," which recognizes certain
legal actions to be legitimate even if the administration taking those actions is not
recognized).
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enforcement of criminal and civil law... . The Court
maintains its opinion that allowing the respondent State to
correct wrongs imputable to it does not amount to an
indirect legitimisation of a regime unlawful under
international law.402
The Court, therefore, found the applicants had to apply to the IPC
before the ECHR could consider their claims because "[a]n
appropriate domestic body, with access to the properties, registries
and records, is clearly the more appropriate forum for deciding on
complex matters of property ownership and valuation and
assessing financial compensation."4 0 3
Unlike in previous ECHR cases, Turkey did not deny
responsibility for the situation in northern Cyprus nor did it reject
GCs' claims that they were entitled to legal recourse.4 04 The Court
noted the passage of time and its concern that:
many decades after the loss of possession by the then
owners, property has in many cases changed hands, by gift,
succession or otherwise; those claiming title may have
never seen, or ever used the property in question. The
issue arises to what extent the notion of legal title, and the
expectation of enjoying the full benefits of that title, is
realistic in practice. The losses thus claimed become
increasingly speculative and hypothetical. There has, it
may be recalled, always been a strong legal and factual
link between ownership and possession ... and it must be
recognized that with the passage of time the holding of a
title may be emptied of any practical consequences.40 5
402 Id. § 96.
403 Demopoulos, 50 EUR. CT. H.R. § 97 (rejecting the claim that due to the "time,
effort, and humiliation" that they would suffer in having to apply to the IPC "after years
of continuing and flagrant violations," the exhaustion requirement should not apply).
The court also noted that "the argument that it would be galling to have recourse to
authorities in northern Cyprus cannot be given decisive weight - against the background
of conflict and hostility, similar argument might be raised in respect of any official body
or authority on the Turkish mainland, or indeed by any victim of a violation who is faced
with the prospect of asking for redress from a State which has been responsible for the
injury suffered." Id. § 98.
404 Id. § 108.
405 Id. § 111; see id. § 113 (concluding that as the link between title and property
possession becomes more attenuated, the redress necessary to satisfy Article 35 may
change).
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Although GCs desired restitution, the Court found that the
payment of full and fair compensation would be sufficient to
remedy the violation because "property is a material commodity
which can be valued and compensated for in monetary terms."406
The ECHR ultimately found that even in Cyprus, member states
were best able to choose how to remedy violations and that it
should accord Turkey and the TRNC some deference in
determining how to proceed as long as GCs were adequately
compensated.40 7
As to the composition of the IPC, the Court found that the GCs
had failed to adequately call into question the integrity of its
members. 4 08  Although the ECHR acknowledged that Cypriot
members of the IPC were likely to have been affected by the
Cyprus Problem in some manner, the Court found that the GCs
had not demonstrated unfairness.4 09 Even the fact that the TRNC
President was charged with nominating the members did not cause
the ECHR to find the IPC invalid.41 0 The Court also dismissed the
applicants' claims that the IPC offered awards that were
"unreasonably low,'411 mentioning that GCs often claimed awards
based on high rates of interest and speculative assumptions.41 2
Although conceding that GCs may experience difficulties in
proving their property ownership, the ECHR found that the IPC's
standard of proof as to property ownership was not unreasonable
as there was no evidence that applying the standard had led to the
rejection of a significant number of claims.4 13 Claims must be
validated before relief is provided, and applicants to the ECHR
would similarly have to provide evidence of ownership before the
406 Id § 115.
407 See id §§ 115, 118 (explaining that member states are better equipped "to assess
the practicalities, priorities and conflicting interests on a domestic level").
408 See id § 120.
409 Demopoulos, 50 EuR. CT. H.R. § 120.
410 Id.
411 Id. § 121.
412 See id § 122 (discrediting the claim that IPC awards inadequately compensated
GCs for only two to six percent of actual losses since the requested GC damages often
relied on calculations of claims that may not have been alleged, rates of interest that the
Court had never previously accepted, and values that were "disproportionately high,
given the speculative nature of the assumptions being made as to their profitability").
413 See id. § 124.
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Court considered their application to be admissible.4 14 As a result,
the court found that the 2005 Law provided an "accessible and
effective framework of redress" and that it would reject GC
applications alleging property violations where the applicant had
not yet applied to the IPC.4 15
V. Possible Recourse to the European Court of Justice-
Apostolides v. Orams
Since GCs must now apply to the IPC before seeking review
from the ECHR, GCs may increasingly attempt to utilize other
forums to secure judgments against Turkey, TCs, the TRNC, and
even foreign nationals occupying and purporting to own GC
properties in northern Cyprus. A new development for GCs
occurred in 2009 as a result of a case in the European Court of
Justice ("ECJ"), Apostolides v. Orams.4 16 Orams confronts the
Cyprus Problem from a slightly different angle than the ECHR
cases: not only are GC homes and properties being claimed and
inhabited by TCs and Turks, but there is also an increasing trend
of foreign nationals "purchasing" GC properties.4 17
As a result of Orams, GCs who have secured judgments in the
Republic may be able to have those judgments enforced by other
EU member states. 4 18 Thus foreign nationals who purchase and
occupy property in northern Cyprus may be held accountable for
their actions even if they are beyond the reach of the Cypriot court
system.4 19 The litigation in Orams began after Meletis Apostolides
brought suit in a Nicosia district court against a British couple, the
Orams, in 2004.420 Apostolides owned land in northern Cyprus
prior to the 1974 invasion.'"' The Orams claimed that in 2002,
they purchased the land in northern Cyprus in good faith from a
third party who, in turn, had purchased the land from the TRNC.4 22
414 See id.
415 Demopoulos, 50 EUR. CT. H.R. § 127.
416 Case C-420/07, Apostolides v. Orams, 2009 E.C.R. 1-03571 [hereinafter Orams].
417 See COUFOUDAKIS, supra note 2, at 70, 73.
418 See id. at 79.
419 See id.
420 See Orams, 2009 E.C.R. 1-03571 §§ 2, 17, 21.
421 See id. § 18.
422 See id. § 19.
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They proceeded to build a villa on the land, using it as a second
home.42 3 When the Orams failed to make a timely appearance in
court, a default judgment was issued against them,424 requiring
them to demolish their villa and to compensate Apostolides for
rent and costs, in addition to delivering possession to
Apostolides.42 5
Despite the default judgment, the Orams were able to appeal
the decision; however, their appeal was ultimately dismissed after
they failed to "put forward an arguable defence to dispute
Apostolides' title to the land."426 To enforce the judgment against
the Orams, Apostolides pursued execution through the English
court system.427 Pursuant to Regulation No. 44/2001, the Master
of the High Court of Justice found the judgment enforceable in
England.4 28 On appeal, a High Court judge set aside the order;429
subsequent proceedings were stayed pending the ECJ's resolution
of certain questions, including whether a member state could
enforce a judgment rendered by a court in the Republic due to the
fact that the Republic did not exercise effective control over
northern Cyprus.430 The ECJ ultimately found that the judgment
was enforceable.4 3 1
423 See id.
424 See id §§ 21-26 (noting that Mrs. Orams was served with a document in Greek,
a language she did not understand, and due to other complications, no one entered an
appearance for the Orams by the necessary date).
425 Id. § 26.
426 Orams, 2009 E.C.R. 1-03571 § 27.
427 Id. § 29.
428 See id; see also CouFOUDAKIS, supra note 2, at 79 (indicating that under EU
Regulation 44/200 1, this judgment "could be enforced in any EU member state").
429 See CouFouDAKIs, supra note 2, at 79 (describing the ruling of the High Court
of Justice that there was no jurisdiction and that the case should be heard in the ECHR
with Turkey serving as the defendant rather than the Orams).
430 See Orams, 2009 E.C.R. 1-03571 §§ 30-3 1.
431 See id § 82; see also Judgment of the UK Court ofAppeal (England and Wales)
(Civil Division) in the Case of Meletios Apostolides v. David Charles Orams & Linda
Elizabeth Orams January 19, 2010, PRNEWSWIRE (Jan. 27, 2010),
http://www.pmewswire.com/news-releases/judgment-of-the-uk-court-of-appeal-england-
and-wales-civil-division-in-the-case-of-meletios-apostolides-v-david-charles-orams--
linda-elizabeth-orams-january-19-2010-82802657.html [hereinafter UK Court of
Appeal] ("In its judgment on April 27, 2009, the ECJ ruled that a judgment of a Court in
the Republic of Cyprus must be recognized and enforced by all other EU Member States
even if it concerns land situated in the Turkish occupied areas of Cyprus. The ECJ
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Following the ECJ's decision, the case proceeded to the United
Kingdom Court of Appeal, which dismissed the Orams' claims,
upholding the ECJ decision.432 The decision is final and binding
on all EU member states.433 As a result, the judgments of Cypriot
courts regarding GC claims to property in northern "Cyprus can be
registered and executed on the basis of European Union
Regulation No. 44/2001 in the EU Member States where the
usurpers of the properties reside."4 34 Due to this decision, the right
of GCs to their property has been reaffirmed, as has the principle
that the laws of the Republic apply even in the occupied north.43 5
Furthermore, the decision:
acknowledges that the Courts of the Republic of Cyprus
have exclusive jurisdiction to decide on cases regarding
immovable property in the Turkish occupied areas of
Cyprus and that the British authorities, and by extension
the authorities of EU Member States, have an obligation to
acknowledge and implement those decisions in their
respective countries. Greek Cypriot dispossessed owners
now have the opportunity to defend their rights before the
competent Courts of the Republic of Cyprus and then use
European Union Regulation No 44/2001 to seek execution
of the Cypriot Court judgments related to property in the
occupied areas in EU Member States.43 6
Although the Orams decision has a limited scope, it offers a
ruling stated that the suspension of the application of European Union law in the areas
where the Government of the Republic of Cyprus does not exercise effective control and
the fact that the judgment of a Cypriot Court cannot, as a practical matter, be enforced in
the occupied areas, do not preclude the application of European Union Regulation No
44/2001 (Brussels I Regulation) and thus the recognition and the enforcement of the
Cypriot Court judgments in another EU Member State. In this landmark judgment, the
ECJ also reaffirmed the territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus and the
competence of the Republic's authorities over the whole territory of Cyprus and
reasserted once again the undeniable right of all Greek Cypriot dispossessed owners to
their properties in the occupied areas, in spite of the illegal Turkish occupation since
1974 and the fact that the Republic of Cyprus does not exercise effective control in those
areas.").
432 See UK Court of Appeal, supra note 431.
433 Id.
434 Id.
435 Id
436 Id.
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promising possibility for GCs seeking relief against EU nationals
who have purchased their property in northern Cyprus. Because
of Orams, GCs may be able to avoid application to the IPC, and
foreign nationals may be deterred from buying and using GC-
owned property in northern Cyprus.
VI. Conclusion
For GCs, the Demopoulos decision ends an era in which GCs
could sidestep direct dealings with the TRNC and receive relief
from Turkey's 1974 invasion through the ECHR. GC applications
deemed admissible prior to the 2005 Law's enactment may remain
under the ECHR's jurisdiction; however, other GCs must now
apply to the IPC before seeking review in the Court. GCs must
exhaust all stages of process offered by the 2005 Law before the
ECHR may consider their claims. 4 Although this does not
completely deprive GCs of ECHR review, GCs taking claims to
the ECHR on appellate review will have the IPC's decision to
counter before the ECHR will grant them relief.
Moreover, this decision recognizes that the TRNC can create a
legitimate domestic remedy recognized as valid by an important
entity in the international community. The practical necessity of a
domestic remedy was a driving force behind the Court's decision
to recognize the IPC; the Court felt that it could no longer continue
to address each GC property claim as a court of first instance. The
difficulties that the Committee faced in attempting to enforce the
ECHR's judgments were a drain on resources and a constant
source of tension. As a result, GCs must now either resort to the
IPC or await a political settlement of the Cyprus Problem before
they are granted relief. In certain instances, however, GCs may be
able to take advantage of the recent Orams decision to bypass both
the IPC and the ECHR. As Orams will only be of use to GCs
whose property is owned or occupied by citizens of other EU
countries, however, Demopoulos is a huge blow to a significant
portion of the GC community.
Beyond the psychological defeat experienced by GCs in
Demopoulos, GCs will also have to deal with the practical effect
of the Court's decision. GCs must now submit claims to the
TRNC's IPC in order to seek relief, despite the fact that the
437 Id.
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TRNC's illegality is internationally recognized. In addition, the
members of the IPC are overwhelmingly TC, and the presence of
foreign members on the committee is insufficient to prevent a
majority of TC members from voting as they please. GCs may
also be unable to bring certain claims before the IPC, and
accepting compensation requires them to relinquish title to their
properties, something that was never required of them by the
ECHR. Although appellate review is available, GCs will have to
overcome problems of proof in order to prove ownership. Even
GCs who ultimately receive restitution of their property will have
to continue to wait until the resolution of the Cyprus Problem at a
political level before they are able to possess and enjoy their
property. Because of the severe limitations on restitution under
the 2005 Law, only a small minority of GCs will be entitled to
restitution, and most will have to accept compensation.
The effects of Demopoulos will permeate both the GC and TC
communities. It will also have a substantial impact on Turkey,
which will no longer play a primary role in providing relief to GCs
who own property in northern Cyprus. Despite Turkey's
continuous failure to satisfy the ECHR's judgments in GC
property cases, Turkey has been allowed to pass the torch to the
IPC, which hopefully will have a better record of success in
carrying through with its obligations to remedy violations of the
Convention. Whether Turkey is allowed to become an EU
member remains to be seen; however, the provision of relief to
GCs, and ultimately the resolution of the Cyprus Problem, are
important considerations that the EU will likely take into account
in making its decision. Despite the ECHR's assertions that
recognition of the IPC is not equivalent to acceptance of the
TRNC, the Demopoulos decision represents international
sentiment that resolution of the Cyprus Problem is past due.
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